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Abstract
Researchers have found considerable evidence that information about school performance
aﬀects people’s choices about which schools to send their children to and even where to live.
In contrast, little attention has been paid to the eﬀects of school performance information on
people’s political behavior. Yet Hirschman (1970) famously highlighted the importance of
taking seriously not only economic forces, but also the role of “political mechanisms”, that is,
“non-market forces” or “voice”, in analyzing people’s responses to school performance and
the implications of these responses for school outcomes. This dissertation explores the eﬀect
of information about student and school performance on people’s political attitudes and be-
havior. I ﬁrst present ﬁndings from an original dataset of school board elections in Florida
that indicate that voters fail to punish school board incumbents in response to information
signaling poor school performance. There is even evidence that voters sometimes reward
incumbents for failure. I next analyze a dataset that links student test scores in England
to a subsequent survey, and ﬁnd that that informational signals about individual student
performance can have long-lasting eﬀects on parental behavior. Finally, I analyze the results
of a survey experiment administered to a nationally representative sample of Americans,
and ﬁnd that information about the relative performance of local schools depresses average
perceptions of local school quality and increases support for school reforms.
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xiii1 Introduction
Americans have relatively favorable views of the performance of their local schools, and pay
little attention to local school politics. An annual PDK/Gallup poll of attitudes toward
public schools has consistently found the proportion of respondents rating schools in their
community A or B to be greater than the proportion rating schools nationally A or B,
since both questions were ﬁrst asked in 1981. At the same time, most Americans pay little
attention to school board politics. School board elections are typically “low-interest, low-
information” aﬀairs, with low turnout and high rates of incumbent re-election (Moe 2005,
12, 18, see also Kirst and Wirt 2009, 135).
Citizens’ satisfaction with local schools and their inattention to local school politics have
implications for school performance. Satisfaction with local schools reduces the pressure
on school leaders to improve; yet direct pressure on school leaders can play an important
role in bringing about improvements in schools (Bushaw and Lopez 2010, 13, Hirschman
1970, 4, 53). In addition, local electoral politics has a central role in public schooling in
the United States. There are over 13,000 school districts in the United States, which make
decisions about everything from class sizes, to teachers’ salaries, to the curriculum (Berkman
and Plutzer 2005, 1).1 Most of these districts are governed by an elected school board. If
citizens pay little attention to school board politics, they are unlikely to hold elected oﬃcials
1http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_098.asp. Accessed 18th June 2014.
1accountable and thus incentivize good performance.
Al a c ko fi n f o r m a t i o no nt h ep a r to fc i t i z e n sa b o u tl o c a ls c h o o lp e r f o r m a n c em a yh e l p
to explain their satisfaction with local schools and inattention to local school politics. The
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 required states to issue annual report cards informing
parents of the proportion of students at their child’s schools reaching proﬁciency on state
academic standards. However, states are allowed to design their own exams and set their own
proﬁciency standards, and these standards vary widely (Peterson and Lastra-Anadon 2010).
It is therefore diﬃcult for citizens to judge the relative performance of their local schools. In
addition, where the local media pay little attention to the publication of school performance
information, many citizens may be unaware of even the performance information that is
publicly available (Berry and Howell 2007, 855).
Where citizens lack full information about the performance of their local schools, the
provision of school performance information may aﬀect citizens’ perceptions and political
behavior. Despite its limitations, No Child Left Behind may have made Americans more
critical of local school performance than they would otherwise have been. More rigorous
systems of public accountability in some states may have had further political consequences;
for example, Florida assigns each school a grade A-F based on state test results. The align-
ment of state assessments through the Common Core State Standards in 2014-2015 could
also aﬀect people’s perceptions of school performance and political behavior, by facilitating
the comparison of schools nationally.
More than forty years ago, Hirschman (1970, 19) stressed the importance of taking seri-
ously the role of “political mechanisms”, that is, “non-market forces” or “voice”, in analyz-
ing people’s responses to school performance. Almost all subsequent studies of the eﬀects
of school performance information, however, have continued to treat the economic mecha-
2nism, exit, as “the only one to be taken seriously” (Hirschman 1970, 16). Numerous studies
have found that information about school test scores aﬀects house prices and parents’ school
choices (for example, Weimer and Wolkoﬀ 2001, Figlio and Lucas 2004, Henderson 2010).2
In contrast, the political consequences of school performance information have received little
attention (Berry and Howell 2005, 153).
This dissertation explores the political eﬀects of performance information in public school-
ing on people’s political attitudes and behavior. A ﬁrst paper considers the eﬀects of in-
formational signals about school performance on incumbent support and turnout in school
board elections. Drawing on a literature on retrospective voting, I hypothesize that in most
cases informational signals about school performance will have no eﬀect on incumbent vote
share or turnout, as citizens generally pay little attention to school board elections. Citizens
will take notice when information signals that a school is failing; however, this will lead to
an increase in incumbent vote share, as incumbents are better resourced than challengers in
communicating with voters about this failure.
Ic o n s t r u c ta no r i g i n a ld a t a s e to fp r e c i n c t - l e v e le l e c t i o nr e s u l t sa n dt u r n o u ti ns c h o o l
board elections in Florida in 2006, 2008, and 2010. I combine this with information about
the points and grades awarded to elementary schools under Florida’s state accountability
system, linking each precinct to its nearest school. I then employ a regression discontinuity
design to compare schools just above and below each grade cutoﬀ. I ﬁnd no evidence of
discontinuities in incumbent vote share at the A/B, B/C, or C/D grade cutoﬀs in any year,
and evidence of a jump in incumbent vote share at the F/D cutoﬀ, consistent with my
expectations.
As e c o n dp a p e re x p l o r e st h ee ﬀ e c t so fi n f o r m a t i o n a ls i g n a l sa b o u ts t u d e n tp e r f o r m a n c e
2For overviews of the literature on school performance and house prices see Black and Machin (2011) and
Gibbons et al. (2013).
3on subsequent parental behavior. I begin by drawing on Hirschman’s insights into the roles
of exit and voice to understand parental responses to performance information. I also draw
on subsequent developments in social science research to unpack the concept of voice. I
hypothesize that where parents do not respond to information signaling poor student per-
formance with exit, they will instead express their concerns to their child’s school, engage in
individual and collective coproduction of education, such as helping out with homework or
in class, and top up their child’s schooling with private tuition.
Ie m p l o yad a t a s e tt h a tl i n k ss t u d e n tt e s ts c o r e si nl o w - s t a k e se x a m si nE n g l a n ds a ta t
age 11, to a subsequent survey of students and their parents. I ﬁnd that telling parents that
their child is below the nationally expected standard in math, rather than at that standard,
leads them to talk to their child’s teachers more often. I also ﬁnd that telling parents that
their child is above the nationally expected standard, rather than at that standard, leads
parents to spend less on private tuition. These eﬀects are found three years after the parents
were informed of their children’s performance, and after the children have moved schools.
Aﬁ n a lp a p e re x p l o r e st h ee ﬀ e c t so fi n f o r m a t i o na b o u tt h er e l a t i v ep e r f o r m a n c eo fl o c a l
schools on people’s perceptions of school quality and attitudes toward school reform. To
understand the role that information plays in explaining the gap between people’s perceptions
of local schools and schools nationally, I draw on a literature exploring a similar gap between
people’s perceptions of their own Congressmen and Congress as whole. Based on insights
from this literature, I hypothesize that providing people with information about the relative
performance of their local schools will depress their perceptions of local school quality and
increase their support for school reforms.
Ia n a l y z ed a t af r o mas u r v e ye x p e r i m e n ta d m i n i s t e r e dt oan a t i o n a l l yr e p r e s e n t a t i v e
sample of Americans that provided diﬀerent treatment groups with information about the
4performance of their local schools relative to schools in their state, nationally, or internation-
ally. I ﬁnd that being presented with relative performance information on average depresses
people’s perceptions of local school quality. The size of each treatment eﬀect declines in the
relative performance measure with which respondents are presented. I also ﬁnd that in some
cases providing people with information about the relative performance of their local schools
increases support for charter schools and school vouchers. Again, the size of the treatment
eﬀect declines in the performance measure with which respondents are presented.
In sum, the results presented in this dissertation provide no evidence that voters punish
incumbents in school board elections for information signaling poor school performance,
and there is even some evidence that incumbent vote share increases near failing schools.
I also ﬁnd, however, that information about the performance of individual students has
important and long lasting eﬀects on parental behavior. In addition, I present evidence that
information about the relative performance of local schools depresses people’s perceptions
of the quality of local schools and increases support for school reforms. The results in this
paper point to the importance of understanding the political eﬀects of student and school
performance information, and how these eﬀects vary with the design of particular systems
of public accountability.
52 The Eﬀects of Informational Signals
About School Performance on In-
cumbent Support in School Board
Elections
Researchers have found that voters in local elections frequently fail to hold oﬃcials account-
able for their performance (Berry and Howell 2007, 846, Trounstine 2010, 417-418).1 Oliver
and Ha (2007) ﬁnd no relationship between voters’ perceptions of local government perfor-
mance and their vote choices in council and mayoral elections, while Brender (2003) ﬁnds
that voters punish Israeli mayors for poor ﬁscal performance in only one of the three election
cycles that he considers. Likewise, Berry and Howell (2007) ﬁnd that voters punish incum-
bents in school board elections for poor school performance in only one of three election
cycles.
A lack of information on the part of citizens about the performance of local services may
help to explain the lack of retrospective voting in many local elections. Studies have found
little correlation between citizen performance evaluations and administrative measures of
performance in policing, ﬁre ﬁghting, refuse collection, and other public services (Stipak
1For an overview of studies of retrospective voting at the local level, see Trounstine (2010).
61979, Brown and Coulter 1983, Brown and Benedict 2002, Kelly 2003). At the same time,
there is evidence that voters are less likely to hold their representatives accountable when
they lack information about the performance of local services or the economy. Brender (2003)
argues that incumbent mayors were punished for poor ﬁscal performance only in years when
the media presented voters with an unusually large amount of relevant information.
An u m b e ro fr e c e n ts t u d i e sh a v es u g g e s t e dt h a tt h ep u b l i c a t i o no fi n f o r m a t i o nc o n c e r n i n g
the performance of local representatives may help to facilitate retrospective voting (Healy
and Malhotra 2013, 16). Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2012) exploit natural experiments to
show that the publication of information about municipal corruption leads voters in Brazil
to throw out corrupt mayors. Berry and Howell (2007) ﬁnd a relationship between school
performance and incumbent vote share at the precinct level in school board elections in one
election cycle, and argue that the introduction of a new accountability system was responsible
for this result.
None of these studies, however, identiﬁes the causal eﬀect of information about public
service outcomes at the local level on voter behavior. Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2012) focus
on information reported at the municipal level and on corruption, rather than public service
outcomes. Berry and Howell (2007) are not able to separate the causal eﬀect of performance
information from the eﬀect of underlying performance. It is also unclear how much light
these ﬁndings shed on the functioning of most US local elections. Ferraz and Finan employ
data from Brazil, while Berry and Howell (2007, 857) stress that it is unclear whether their
ﬁndings extend beyond South Carolina.2
This paper therefore explores whether informational signals about school performance
aﬀect incumbent support in school board elections. I ﬁrst draw on an extensive literature
2South Carolina is unusual in having one of the best testing regimes in the nation and particularly weak
teacher unions (Berry and Howell 2007, 857).
7on retrospective voting to develop hypotheses concerning the eﬀects of informational signals
about school performance. I then test these hypotheses using an original dataset that links
precinct-level school board election results in Florida from 2006-2010 to school outcomes. I
employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal eﬀect of the grades awarded
to schools on voter behavior. Finally, the implications of this paper’s ﬁndings for both
discussions of the future of elected school boards and research into retrospective voting are
considered.
2.1 Predicting The Eﬀects of School Grades
There are grounds for expecting voters to punish school board incumbents for information
signaling poor school performance. A literature on retrospective voting has found consistent
evidence that in US state and national elections at least some citizens evaluate the per-
formance of incumbents and vote accordingly (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 195, Berry
and Howell 2007, 845, Linn et al 2010, 375-376). Several features of school board elections
in Florida enhance the possibility that voters will hold school board members accountable
for poor school grades. Members’ job responsibilities are reasonably well deﬁned, and since
school board elections in Florida are by law non-partisan, party identiﬁcation will not rival
retrospective evaluations (see Berry and Howell 2007, 847). In addition, the grades assigned
to schools “receive considerable media attention in Florida” and have already been show to
aﬀect citizens’ perceptions of local school quality (Chingos et al. 2012, 22).
Existing studies of retrospective voting also suggest, however, that voters may ignore
oﬃcial performance measures in evaluating public services, relying instead on other heuristics
(Berry and Howell 2007, 848). Studies of retrospective voting at the state and national level
have explored whether voters pay attention to their own economic circumstances, rather
8than the national economy (Linn et al. 2010, 278). It seems particularly likely that people
will evaluate local school performance based on their own or their children’s experiences, as
public schools are ubiquitous and people have frequent contact with them (see Chingos et
al. 2012, 7). For example, more than 50 percent of Americans report having visited a public
school within the past 12 months (Bushaw and Lopez 2012, 12).
Even if voters do use publicly reported performance information in evaluating schools,
for this information to inﬂuence behavior at the ballot box voters must also have at least
some knowledge of school board elections and candidates. Oliver and Ha (2007, 395) pro-
vide evidence from city council elections, for example, that “when voters [are] less interested
or informed about local elections...[they are] more likely to support incumbents, in the ab-
sence of any other information” (see also Trounstine 2010, 7). However, “citizens are poorly
informed about [school board elections], and seemingly disinterested in acquiring such in-
formation” (Kirst and Wirt 2009, 135). One indication of this is the low turnout in school
board elections; for example, Moe (2005, 18) ﬁnds median turnout to be just 9 percent in
the elections that he considers.
Given the availability of other heuristics as alternatives to test scores in evaluating school
performance, and citizens’ lack of interest in school board politics, I hypothesize that in most
cases school grades will have little or no eﬀect on incumbent support. The one exception, is
that when a school receives a failing grade I expect this to lead to an increase in incumbent
vote share in nearby precincts. A failing grade will be enough of a shock for citizens to take
notice and become more interested in school board politics. Though partly responsible for
this grade, incumbents can seek to shift the blame to the school leadership or to other levels
of government. An extensive literature has documented the diﬃcultly that citizens face in
assigning blame in the context of divided government (Linn et al. 2010, 383). School board
incumbents are particularly well placed to shift the blame, as most citizens will have been
9paying little attention to school board politics during the school year in which the failure
occurred.
Incumbents in school board elections also have more resources at their disposal than
challengers when it comes to getting their message across to voters, in this case, that they
are not to blame and can provide a solution. The multiple beneﬁts of electoral incumbency
have been well documented and may include money, networks, prior campaign experience,
successes in other areas, and endorsements from local media, organizations, or prominent
ﬁgures (Trounstine 2010, 417). Such resources are likely to prove especially useful in school
board races, where typically the media pays little attention, and budgets are small, with
candidates relying on personal funds or donations from family and friends (Hess 2008, 143-
145).
2.2 School accountability in Florida
I focus on Florida because the state’s accountability system permits the use of a regression
discontinuity design to identify the eﬀects of school accountability grades, by comparing
schools just above and below each grade cutoﬀ. Under Florida’s current system, which was
introduced in 2002, schools are assigned a grade A, B, C, D, or F each year. This grade is
a function of the points awarded to schools according to absolute student performance and
student learning gains on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test, with some caveats.3
3In 2010 and 2008 elementary and middle schools were awarded a maximum of 400 points according to the
proportion of students scoring high on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test, and total of 400 points
according to the proportion of students in diﬀerent groups making learning gains on the test. In addition, to
be awarded speciﬁed grade schools had to meet minimum requirements for progress of the lowest performing
students, and the number of students tested. The grade thresholds were set at 525 points for an A, 495 for
a B, 435 for a C, and 395 for a D. There were diﬀerent grade thresholds in 2006, and a diﬀerent system for
awarding points for learning gains. See: http://schoolgrades.fldoe.org/reports/index.asp. Accessed
27th March 2014.
10If a school receives two F grades in a period of four years, all pupils at the school are eligible
for vouchers to move to a private or higher performing school (Chakrabarti 2013, 501).
Ac o m m o nt h r e a tt ot h ev a l i d i t yo fr e g r e s s i o nd i s c o n t i n u i t yd e s i g n si st h a tt h eu n d e r l y i n g
score is subject to manipulation around the cutoﬀs; for example, some schools just below a
cutoﬀ might work particularly hard to improve. As the grades awarded to schools in Florida
depend on measures of both absolute performance and student gains, and on the results
of all students, it seems highly unlikely that such manipulation would be feasible. Further,
numerous studies have already employed regression discontinuity designs to explore the eﬀect
of school grades in Florida, and have tested the validity of the method’s assumptions in this
context (Chiang 2009, Chakrabarti 2013, Rouse et al. 2007, Henderson 2010, Figlio and
Lucas 2004).
A further advantage of focusing on Florida is that the grades assigned to schools continue
to be widely publicized and there is evidence that these grades aﬀect citizens’ perceptions
of school quality and behavior (Chingos et al. 2012). Consequently, it will be diﬃcult to at-
tribute any null ﬁndings to citizens being unaware of the published performance information,
as in Berry and Howell (2007, 854-856). Further, Florida school accountability grades are
released shortly before the school board primary elections, and so are likely fresh in voter’s
minds.4
School board members in Florida serve staggered terms of four years and are chosen in
non-partisan elections. Each of the sixty-seven counties in Florida constitutes a school board
district and is governed by a school board of either ﬁve or seven members. Counties vary
4In 2010, school accountability grades were released on 6th August, and the primary election was held
on 24th August (http://www.myfoxtampabay.com/story/18032390/despite-fcat-questions-grades-
released. Accessed 18th June 2014). In 2008, school accountability grades were released by the
Florida Department of Education on 8th July, and the primary election was held on 26th August (http:
//www.orlandosentinel.com/orl-bk-2008-florida-school-grades-070808,0,3235444.story. Ac-
cessed 19th June 2014).
11in selecting school board members in at-large elections, wherein each voter in a district is
entitled to vote in the election, single-member elections, wherein only voters in a particular
residence area are eligible to vote, and some combination of the two.5 An additional ad-
vantage of employing data from Florida is that school grades are published after the ﬁling
deadline for school board candidates. 6 This helps to mitigate the problem of sample bias
that would result if incumbents responsible for schools receiving low grades were less likely
to run.
2.3 Data
The points and grades awarded to each school were obtained from the Florida Department
of Education, along with information about school characteristics.7 Further data on school
characteristics, including the location of each school, were obtained from the National Center
for Education Statistics Common Core of Data.8 Maps of school attendance zones for the
academic year 2009-2010 were obtained from the School Attendance Boundary Information
System.9
Precinct-level election results for school board elections in 2006, 2008, and 2010 were
5http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/FileStores/Web/HouseContent/Approved/Web\%20Site/
education_fact_sheets/2011/documents/2010-11\%20Florida\%20District\%20School\%20Boards.
3b.pdf
6In 2010 school board candidates had to qualify by 18th June (Florida Department of State 2009, 3). In
2008 school board candidates had to qualify by 20th June (Florida Department of State 2007, 3).
7http://schoolgrades.fldoe.org/
8http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubschuniv.asp
9http://www.sabinsdata.org/. Attendance zone boundaries are provided from the year 2009-2010. For
2009-2010, attendance zone boundaries are available for 29 of the 67 countries in Florida: Alachua, Bay,
Brevard, Broward, Clay, Collier, Duval, Escambia, Franklin, Hernando, Hillsborough, Lafayette, Lake, Lee,
Leon, Manatee, Marion, Miami-Dade, Okaloosa, Orange, Osceolla, Palm Beach, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, Santa
Rosa, Seminole, St Lucie, Volusia. School attendance zone boundaries were unavailable for other years.
12obtained from each of the Supervisors of Elections in Florida’s sixty-seven counties, as Florida
does not collect precinct-level election data for local races centrally. The incumbent in each
school board race was identiﬁed using a comprehensive list of the candidates in school board
races provided by the Florida School Board Association. Where possible, this was checked
against the results from previous elections obtained from the Supervisors of Elections.
Electoral precinct boundaries for 2006, 2008, and 2010 were obtained from the Florida
House of Representatives Redistricting Committee, as was voter registration data for 2010.10
Voter registration data for 2008 was obtained from the Florida Division of Elections.11 Voter
registration data for 2006 was obtained from the Supervisors of Elections, but were not
available for all precincts.
2.4 Method
Id e ﬁ n ep r e c i n c t - i n c u m b e n tc o m b i n a t i o n sa sm yu n i t s ;f o re x a m p l e ,p r e c i n c tB R E 0 0 0 1a n d
the ﬁrst school board seat in Brevard County. My sample includes all precinct-incumbent
combinations in which an incumbent ran in a contested primary race in a given year, with
the years considered being 2006, 2008, and 2010. I consider the eﬀect of the grades assigned
to elementary schools, setting aside middle and high schools. I link each precinct to the ele-
mentary school closest to its geographic center. The treatment for each precinct-incumbent
combination is the grade awarded to the elementary school closest to the center of that
precinct.
10https://mydistrictbuilder.wordpress.com/opendata/. Precinct boundaries and voter registration
data were available for 2010 only.
11http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voter-registration/statistics/elections.shtml\#2008. Ac-
cessed 9th June 2014.
13I focus on the results of primary elections, since in many cases the primary winner was
uncontested in the subsequent general election, and I want to avoid a sample that excludes
a non-random group of initial candidates. The two outcomes that I consider are incumbent
vote share and turnout. I measure turnout as the number of votes in a precinct in a given
school board race as a percentage of the number of registered voters in the precinct.
To explore whether there are discontinuities at the grade cutoﬀs, I ﬁrst plot incumbent
vote share or turnout against the school points variable and add regression lines based on
fourth-order polynomial regressions estimated separately on either side of each cutoﬀ. This
graphical presentation of the data gives a sense of “whether the jump in the outcome variable
at the cutoﬀ is unusually large compared to the bumps in the regression curve away from
the cutoﬀ” (Lee and Lemieux 2010, 284). If the basic plot does not show any evidence of
a discontinuity, “there is relatively little chance that...more sophisticated analyses will lead
to robust and credible estimates with statistically and substantially signiﬁcant magnitudes”
(Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 622).
Ad i s a d v a n t a g eo fe m p l o y i n gp o l y n o m i a lr e g r e s s i o n st op r o v i d ef o r m a le s t i m a t e so fd i s -
continuities at the grade cutoﬀs, however, is that this method provides global estimates of
the regression function; that is, it uses data far away from the cutoﬀ point to predict values
of the outcome at the cutoﬀ point. In contrast, the justiﬁcation for using a regression discon-
tinuity design relies on comparing local estimates at the cutoﬀ point (Lee and Lemieux 2010,
316). I therefore employ local linear regressions to test for discontinuities at the diﬀerent
grade cutoﬀs.
When using local linear regressions to test for discontinuities at the cutoﬀs, linear re-
gressions are ﬁtted within bins on both sides of the cutoﬀ, and these regressions are then
used to predict values of the outcome variable at the cutoﬀs. We may employ local linear
14regressions that use weights that vary with the distance from the cutoﬀ or the center of the
bin (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 624-625). Standard errors are calculated assuming clustering
at the school level, since treatment is assigned at the school level. Below I compute local
linear regressions for numerous points on either side of a given cutoﬀ and graph predictions
from these local linear regressions; however, the estimate of the jump still uses only the two
estimates at the cutoﬀ (see Nichols 2007, 531).12
Having chosen to use local linear regressions, key issues to consider are the choice of
bandwidth and kernel, that is, the weights to be applied (Nichols 2007, 529). I follow
the approach suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008, 625) and Lee and Lemieux (2010,
319) of employing a simple rectangular kernel, and verifying the robustness of the results
to diﬀerent choices of bandwidth. Employing a rectangular kernel in ﬁtting local linear
regressions amounts to running standard linear regressions within bins on both sides of
the cutoﬀ (Lee and Lemieux 2010, 319). I estimate the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009)
optimal bandwidth for local linear regressions for each cutoﬀ, and use this as a guide in
choosing which bandwidths to employ.
2.5 Results
Table 2.1 reports the number of precinct-incumbent units in the dataset for each election, as
well as the number of unique precincts and schools in each dataset. For 2010 we are able to
estimate discontinuities at all cutoﬀs, however, there are insuﬃcient observations to estimate
discontinuities at the F/D cutoﬀ for 2008, and the F/D or C/D cutoﬀs for 2006. Table 2.2
reports the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) optimal bandwidth for local linear regressions
12All local linear regressions are estimated using the regress discontinuity design package in R: Dimmery,
Drew 2013. “rdd”. Related ﬁgures are plotted using modiﬁed code from this package.
15for each cutoﬀ, for each year. Based on the optimal bandwidths reported in Table 2.2, I
estimate all discontinuities using bandwidths of 10, 15, 20, and 25 points.
Table 2.1: Counts of observations, precincts and schools in each grade, by year
2010 2008 2006
Obs. Precincts Schools Obs. Precincts Schools Obs. Precincts Schools
A 3285 2272 607 3045 2464 609 3628 2175 554
B 769 510 147 829 639 174 1035 642 174
C 1150 719 206 760 652 187 654 471 126
D 177 122 31 66 64 22 23 18 7
F 71 66 18 35 32 8 8 8 4
Total 5452 3692 1009 4735 3851 1000 5348 3314 865
Table 2.2: Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth for local linear regressions of incum-
bent vote share on school points at diﬀerent grade cutoﬀs
2010 2008 2006
A/B 11.25 15.24 13.07
B/C 10.35 14.32 11.87
C/D 10.62 16.52
D/F 10.90
Figure 2.1 plots incumbent vote share against school points for 2010, as well as regression
lines based on fourth-order polynomial regressions estimated separately on either side of each
cutoﬀ. We observe evidence of a drop in incumbent vote share at the F/D and C/D cutoﬀs.
Local linear regression estimates for the C/D cutoﬀ are consistently negative, but the eﬀect
is not statistically signiﬁcant (Table 2.3, Row 3). Local linear regression estimates for the
F/D cutoﬀ are consistently negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level for most
bandwidths. The eﬀect size is surprisingly large when a 10 point bandwidth is used, with
incumbent vote share dropping nearly 30 percentage points (Table 2.3, Row 4).
Figure 2.2 shows that the large estimated drop in incumbent vote share at the F/D cutoﬀ
is consistent with the data, however, it is driven by a small number of points near the cutoﬀ.
Eﬀect sizes for wider bandwidths are all around half this value. Estimates with these wider
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Figure 2.1: Incumbent vote share by school points in the 2010 primary election, with
parametric ﬁt. Vertical lines show the thresholds, from lowest points to highest, for D, C,
B, and A school grades.
bandwidths probably provide a better estimate of the true eﬀect, as these estimates are less
sensitive to individual points and are roughly consistent across bandwidths. Figure 2.3 plots
estimates of incumbent vote share with a 20 point bandwidth.
Figure 2.4 plots incumbent vote share against school points for 2008. There is no indi-
cation of a discontinuity in incumbent vote share at any of the grade cutoﬀs. Local linear
regressions conﬁrm that there is no statistically signiﬁcant discontinuity in incumbent vote
share at any of the grade cutoﬀs (Table 2.3, Rows 5-7). Figure 2.5 plots incumbent vote
share against school points for 2006. There is some indication of a jump in incumbent vote
share at the B/C cutoﬀ, but this appears to be driven by a few points above the B/C cutoﬀ.
Consistent with the polynomial plot, local linear regressions estimates ﬁnd a positive eﬀect
17Table 2.3: Estimates of discontinuities in incumbent vote share at school grade cutoﬀs from
ﬁtting local linear regressions
Bandwidth (School Points)
Year Cutoﬀ 10 15 20 25
(1)
2010
A/B 3.12 2.98 1.36 1.72
(4.03) (3.54) (3.23) (2.94)
(2) B/C 3.45 2.48 2.38 2.72
(3.35) (2.83) (2.75) (2.40)
(3) C/D -18.81 -10.00 -8.70 -12.36*
(13.50) (9.00) (7.52) (5.61)
(4) D/F -28.88*** -12.32. -16.13* -17.32 ***
(5.59) (7.09) (7.32) (6.20)
(5)
2008
A/B 4.64 1.30 3.05 0.891
(5.26) (4.53) (4.02) (3.598)
(6) B/C 1.08 0.22 -0.21 -0.79
(6.21) (4.82) (4.16) (3.90)
(7) C/D 2.88 -7.33 3.86 2.29
(16.91) (9.90) (9.60) (8.35)
(8)
2006
A/B -5.01 -3.00 -3.06 -3.02
(3.86) (3.50) (3.10) (2.84)
(9) B/C 12.63* 3.03 -0.58 -1.14
(5.04) (4.64) (3.84) (2.06)
Standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
at the B/C cutoﬀ for only the smallest bandwidth (Table 3, Model 9).
In e x te x p l o r ew h e t h e rt h e r ea r ed i s c o n t i n u i t i e si nt u r n o u ta tt h eg r a d ec u t o ﬀ sf o ra n y
year. Figures 2.6-2.8 plot turnout against school points for 2010, 2008, and 2006. The only
indication of a discontinuity in turnout suggests a jump in turnout at the B/C cutoﬀ for
the 2008 primary election (Figure 2.7). Consistent with these polynomial plots, ﬁtting local
linear regressions I ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence of an eﬀect at only the B/C cutoﬀ
for 2008 (Table 2.4). Estimates of this jump in turnout are approximately consistent across
bandwidths and signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level or less (Table 2.4, Row 6).
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Figure 2.2: Local linear regression estimates of incumbent vote share at the D/F cutoﬀ in
the 2010 primary election, with 10 point bandwidth
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Figure 2.3: Local linear regression estimates of incumbent vote share at the D/F cutoﬀ in
the 2010 primary election, with 20 point bandwidth
2.6 Speciﬁcation testing
The ﬁnding that there appears to be a drop in incumbent vote share at the F/D cutoﬀ for
2010 merits investigation. We observe a drop in incumbent vote share at the F/D cutoﬀ
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Vertical lines show the thresholds, from lowest points to highest, for D, C, B, and A
school grades.
Figure 2.4: Incumbent vote share by school points in the 2008 primary election, with
parametric ﬁt.
when we ﬁt polynomial regressions, and we also ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant drop when we
ﬁt local linear regressions. This ﬁnding is also consistent with out theoretical expectations.
On the other hand, there is reason to be cautious. A relatively small number of precinct-
incumbent combinations were assigned grades D or F, corresponding to even fewer schools,
and the size of the eﬀect estimate varies across bandwidths.
Aﬁ r s tc o n c e r ni nr e g r e s s i o nd i s c o n t i n u i t yd e s i g n si st h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fc h a n g e si nc o v a r i -
ate values at the cutoﬀs. Such changes could aﬀect the outcome, with the eﬀects being
erroneously attributed to treatment (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 631). To explore this possi-
bility, I employ local linear regressions to test the null hypothesis of zero average eﬀect at the
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Vertical lines show the thresholds, from lowest points to highest, for D, C, B, and A
school grades.
Figure 2.5: Incumbent vote share by school points in the 2006 primary election, with
parametric ﬁt.
F/D cutoﬀ for a range of diﬀerent covariates, which I treat as pseudo-outcomes. Table 2.5
presents results for numerous school and precinct-level covariates, conducting each test for a
range of bandwidths. In only one of the 44 tests conducted do we reject the null hypothesis
at the 0.05 level. I therefore conclude that there is no evidence of a discontinuity at the F/D
cutoﬀ in any of the covariates.
A second concern is manipulation of the running variable that determines grade assign-
ment. If individuals were able to manipulate the assignment variable, one could reasonably
expect individuals on either side of the threshold to diﬀer systematically (Lee and Lemieux
2009, 13-16; Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 631). If points were assigned to schools by inspec-
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Vertical lines show the thresholds, from lowest points to highest, for D, C, B, and A
school grades.
Figure 2.6: Turnout by school points in the 2010 primary election, with parametric ﬁt.
tors who were aware of the cutoﬀs, for example, they might make a judgment about which
schools deserved to fall on either side of the cutoﬀ. To explore this possibility, I ﬁrst plot a
histogram of the points awarded to schools in 2010 (Figure 2.9). There is no indication of a
jump at any of the grade cutoﬀs. I also employ McCarry’s (2008) test for the null hypothesis
of continuity in density of the running variable at the cutoﬀ, against the alternative hypoth-
esis of a jump in the density function. The p-value of McCarry’s test at the F/D cutoﬀ is
0.211. We therefore do not have evidence to reject the null hypothesis of continuity in the
density of the school points variable at the F/D cutoﬀ.
At h i r ds e to ft e s t sc o m m o n l ye m p l o y e di nr e g r e s s i o nd i s c o n t i n u i t yd e s i g n si n v o l v e se s t i -
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Vertical lines show the thresholds, from lowest points to highest, for D, C, B, and A
school grades.
Figure 2.7: Turnout by school points in the 2008 primary election, with parametric ﬁt.
mating jumps at points where there should be no jumps (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 632). Ta-
ble 2.6 presents local linear regression estimates of discontinuities in incumbent vote share for
cutoﬀs 5 and 10 points above and below the F/D cutoﬀ. I employ the Imbens-Kalyanaraman
bandwidth and multiples of this bandwidth in each case, rather than bandwidths based on
the initial cutoﬀs used above, to maximize the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis.
There is no evidence of a jump in incumbent vote share at any of these placebo cutoﬀs.
I next employ the same series of tests to explore whether the jump in turnout at the B/C
cutoﬀ for 2008 is explained by a failure of the assumption of the regression discontinuity
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Vertical lines show the thresholds, from lowest points to highest, for D, C, B, and A
school grades.
Figure 2.8: Turnout by school points in the 2006 primary election, with parametric ﬁt.
design. Table 2.7 presents estimates of the discontinuity at the B/C cutoﬀ for a number
of school level covariates. In no case is there evidence to reject the null hypothesis of zero
average eﬀect at the B/C cutoﬀ. Data to construct the precinct level covariates employed
in Table 2.5 are only available for 2010.
Figure 2.10 plots a histogram of the points awarded to schools in 2008. There is no
indication of a jump in the distribution of school points at any of the cutoﬀs. The p-value
for McCarry’s test at the B/C cutoﬀ is 0.271, meaning that we do not have evidence to
reject the null hypothesis of continuity in the density of the school points variable at the
B/C cutoﬀ. Table 2.8 presents local linear regression estimates for discontinuities in turnout
24Table 2.4: Estimates of discontinuities in turnout at school grade cutoﬀs from ﬁtting local
linear regressions
Bandwidth (School Points)
Year Cutoﬀ 10 15 20 25
(1)
2010
A/B -0.03 -0.05. -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
(2) B/C 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
(3) C/D 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
(4) D/F -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
(5)
2008
A/B 4.25 2.71 2.13 2.12
(3.87) (3.45) (3.07) (2.75)
(6) B/C 8.374. 8.68** 8.09** 6.43*
(4.70) (3.26) (3.03) (2.91)
(7) C/D 0.34 -0.82 -0.33 -1.36
(9.55) (6.24) (6.10) (5.41)
(8)
2006
A/B -1.83 0.43 -0.13 0.04
(2.63) (2.33) (2.17) (2.00)
(9) B/C 1.47 -0.36 -1.06 -0.73
(4.11) (3.52) (2.89) (2.58)
Standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
for cutoﬀs 5 and 10 points above and below the B/C cutoﬀ. There is no evidence of a jump
in turnout at any of the placebo cutoﬀs.
Af u r t h e rc o n c e r ni st h a t2 0 1 0i st h eo n l yy e a rf o rw h i c ht h e r ei ss u ﬃ c i e n td a t at o
provide regression discontinuity estimates for the F/D cutoﬀ, and even in 2010 a relatively
small number of schools were assigned D or F. To help to address this concern, I reﬁt all
local linear regression models pooling data from 2008 and 2010. There is evidence of both
a drop in incumbent vote share at the F/D cutoﬀ, and of a jump in turnout at the B/C
cutoﬀ; however, estimates at both of these cutoﬀs are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth
(Tables 2.9 and 2.10). I do not pool data from 2006, as school grades in 2006 were calculated
25Table 2.5: Testing for discontinuities in covariates at the D/F cutoﬀ, 2010
D/F cutoﬀ only: Bandwidth (Points)
10 15 20 25
School Covs.
Points 09 -33.30 -17.20 -3.81 15.93
(52.97) (34.82) (39.18) (37.18)
%B l a c k 0.34. 0.20 0.01 0.19
(0.20) (0.19) (0.98) (0.19)
% Hispanic 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.19
(0.16) (0.19) (0.25) (0.17)
% FRPL 0.03 0.005 0.04 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Av. Cohort Size -2.70 9.30 5.897 2.21
(16.44) (15.81) (18.39) (14.43)
Precinct Covs.
%D e m o c r a t 0.06 0.04 -0.001 0.04
(0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08)
%R e p u b l i c a n -0.004 -0.02 0.04 0.006
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
%B l a c k 0.15 0.26 0.05 0.09
(0.20) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
% Hispanic 0.04* 0.02 -0.02 0.003
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Av. Age -0.12 0.51 4.72 3.44.
(1.76) (1.55) (2.83) (1.97)
Dist. to School 9.25 5.46 9.13 4.70
(12.14) (7.20) (6.56) (4.01)
Reports local average treatment eﬀect at D/F cutoﬀ, standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
using a slightly diﬀerent method, and the grade cutoﬀs were set at diﬀerent values.13
Ia l s oc o n s i d e ra l t e r n a t i v em e t h o d sf o rl i n k i n gp r e c i n c t st oe l e m e n t a r ys c h o o l s .T h ea n a l -
yses above link each precinct to the elementary school nearest to the precinct’s geographic
center; however, many precincts and school attendance zones are irregular shapes. I there-
fore try linking each precinct to the elementary school whose attendance zone overlaps the
greatest proportion of that precinct. I am only able to do this for 2010, as school attendance
13See fn. 3.
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of points awarded to elementary schools in Florida, 2009-2010.
zone data is unavailable for earlier years. This gives a sample of 3362 precinct-incumbent
combinations. I restrict my sample to precincts where at least half of the precinct was
covered by the school attendance zone, giving a sample of 2881 precinct-school board race
combinations.
Somewhat troublingly, when I link precincts to schools by attendance zone overlap, only
65.70 percent of the precincts in this reduced sample are linked to the same elementary
schools as when I link each precinct to the school nearest the precinct’s center. I use local
27Table 2.6: Regression discontinuity estimates of accountability grade eﬀect on incumbent
vote share, false cutoﬀs, 2010
Cutoﬀ IK Bandwidth IK 1.5IK 2IK 2.5IK
405 20.71 -10.22 -7.08 -3.04 -2.46
(7.16) (7.81) (5.36) (5.04)
400 13.82 10.42 1.37 -6.86 -2.85
(9.44) (9.41) (8.56) (5.73)
390 16.83 1.01 1.83 -6.56 -6.41
(5.10) (5.27) (6.02) (5.70)
385 18.64 19.21 2.62 -7.03 -7.13
(35.17) (26.47) (18.99) (18.92)
Standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001.
The bandwidth is calculated using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman (2009)
method, and models are then estimated with that bandwidth and multiples
of that bandwidth.
Table 2.7: Testing for discontinuities in covariates at the B/C cutoﬀ, 2008
B/C cutoﬀ only: Bandwidth (Points)
10 15 20 25
Points 07 -5.79 -9.77 2.05 -5.66
(25.04) (18.06) (16.38) (14.70)
%B l a c k -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06
(0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
% Hispanic 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
% FRPL -0.01 -0.01 0.0002 -0.004
(0.02) (0.02 ) (0.02) (0.02)
Av. Cohort Size 0.75 -5.48 -9.56 -3.24
(14.60) (12.02) (11.17) (10.14)
Reports local average treatment eﬀect at B/C cutoﬀ, standard errors
in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
linear regressions to estimate jumps at the cutoﬀs, using this reduced sample and linking by
attendance zone overlap. Unfortunately, I cannot test for a discontinuity at the F/D cutoﬀ, as
only 10 schools in this reduced sample were assigned an F grade. However, all other estimates
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of points awarded to elementary schools in Florida, 2007-2008.
are consistent with my original results, with no statistically signiﬁcant discontinuities in
incumbent vote share at the grade cutoﬀs (Table 2.11). Likewise, I again ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant discontinuities in turnout at the school grade cutoﬀs (Table 2.12).
In sum, these results provide evidence of a drop in incumbent vote share at the F/D cutoﬀ
in 2010, the only year in which we were able to obtain regression discontinuity estimates at
the F/D cutoﬀ. Several tests indicate that the assumptions of the regression discontinuity
design hold in this case. Nonetheless, this ﬁnding should be interpreted with caution, as it
relies on a relatively small number of observations and is sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.
The above results also provide evidence of a jump in incumbent vote share at the B/C cutoﬀ
in 2008. Again, there is no evidence that a failure of the assumptions of the regression
29Table 2.8: Regression discontinuity estimates of accountability grade eﬀect on incumbent
vote share, false cutoﬀs, 2008
Cutoﬀ IK Bandwidth IK 1.5IK 2IK 2.5IK
505 12.46 2.84 4.37 4.04 1.12
(5.14) (4.27) (3.75) (3.30)
500 14.71 -1.02 1.43 0.19 -0.81
(5.33) (4.06) (3.61) (3.27)
490 15.17 4.29 2.80 3.85 5.59
(5.36) (4.51) (3.87) (3.48)
485 10.91 -7.89 -2.63 -0.22 2.15
(8.68) (6.02) (5.13) (4.44)
Standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001.
The bandwidth is calculated using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman (2009)
method, and models are then estimated with that bandwidth and
multiples of that bandwidth.
Table 2.9: Estimates of discontinuities in incumbent vote share at school grade cutoﬀs from
ﬁtting local linear regressions, pooling 2008 and 2010
Bandwidth (School Points)
Cutoﬀ 10 15 20 25
A/B 4.06 1.71 2.17 1.30
(3.53) (2.93) (2.66) (2.37)
B/C 2.13 2.08 1.57 1.68
(3.16) (2.65) (2.39) (2.18)
C/D -6.23 -8.05 -4.05 -5.47
(10.73) (6.57) (5.70) (4.64)
D/F -33.81*** -11.93 -11.52 -15.32**
(5.63) (8.56) (8.87) (6.57)
Standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
discontinuity design explains this ﬁnding.
30Table 2.10: Estimates of discontinuities in turnout at school grade cutoﬀs from ﬁtting local
linear regressions, pooling 2008 and 2010
Bandwidth (School Points)
Cutoﬀ 10 15 20 25
A/B 2.25 0.30 0.53 0.25
(2.73) (2.33) (2.10) (1.86)
B/C 6.27* 4.04. 4.44* 3.21
(3.03) (2.40) (2.11) (1.99)
C/D 2.45 1.20 3.18 2.59
(5.23) (3.71) (3.18) (2.85)
D/F -2.16 -4.10 1.42 1.37
(5.48) (3.99) (4.04) (3.46)
Standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
Table 2.11: Estimates of discontinuities in incumbent vote share at school grade cutoﬀs
from ﬁtting local linear regressions, linking precincts to schools by attendance zone overlap,
2010
Bandwidth (School Points)
Cutoﬀ 10 15 20 25
A/B 3.51 2.26 1.43 -0.72
(6.34) (4.75) (4.18) (3.71)
B/C -0.03 1.28 2.36 -0.61
(3.95) (3.38) (3.11) (2.45)
C/D 10.22 6.24 5.96 -1.44
(11.97) (8.04) (6.62) (7.11)
Standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
2.7 Conclusions
This paper employs a regression discontinuity design to explore whether the accountability
grades assigned to schools in Florida aﬀect voter behavior in school board elections in 2006,
2008, and 2010. I ﬁnd no evidence that voters punish school board incumbents at the
precinct level when a school receives a poor grade. This ﬁnding holds across all years and
31Table 2.12: Estimates of discontinuities in turnout at school grade cutoﬀs from ﬁtting local
linear regressions, linking schools to precincts by attendance zone overlap, 2010
Bandwidth (School Points)
Cutoﬀ 10 15 20 25
A/B 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
B/C 0.03 0.01 0.65 0.005
(0.04) (0.03) (0.52) (0.03)
C/D 0.07 -0.001 0.71 0.03
(0.09) (0.06) (0.47) (0.04)
Standard errors in parentheses.
. p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
grade cutoﬀs considered. I also ﬁnd evidence that when a school is assigned a failing grade,
rather than a D grade, this leads to an increase in incumbent vote share. However, although
numerous speciﬁcation checks conﬁrm this ﬁnding, it is only possible to estimate eﬀects at
the F/D cutoﬀ for 2010.
The above ﬁndings are consistent with my theoretical expectations, drawn from a litera-
ture on retrospective voting. When most voters pay little attention to school board elections
and know little about the diﬀerent candidates, information about school performance has
little eﬀect on voters’ behavior. An F grade may be enough to make voters sit up and take
notice, however. When this happens, incumbents are better placed than challengers to com-
municate with voters in criticizing other actors and promising change. The advantages of
incumbency are particularly important in school board elections, where candidates have few
resources and the media pays little attention.
Analyses of turnout suggest that we should interpret our estimate of the discontinuity at
the F/D cutoﬀ with caution, however. There is no evidence of a jump in turnout at the F/D
cutoﬀ in 2010. Although it is possible that for incumbent vote share to increase without a
change in turnout, this is not consistent with my expectation that an F grade would lead
32more voters to take an interest in school board elections. A further concern is that there is
evidence of a jump in turnout at the B/C cutoﬀ in 2008 only, and there are no theoretical
grounds for expecting a jump in turnout at only this cutoﬀ, in only one year. This points to
the possibility of spurious ﬁndings, although the placebo cutoﬀ tests conducted somewhat
mitigate this concern.
The ﬁndings presented in this paper have implications for discussions over the future of
elected school boards and for research into retrospective voting at the local level. These
ﬁndings oﬀer some support to the claim that school board elections have become an “obso-
lete mechanism of democracy” (Alsbury 2008, 247). Retrospective voting allows voters to
“incentivize politicians by sanctioning poor performanceand selecting leaders who will act
competently and honestly”, and its apparent absence is therefore a normative concern (Healy
and Malhotra 2013, 18.2). Of course, we should not go too far in drawing conclusions from
the ﬁndings presented in this paper. Voters may still hold school board members accountable
for performance at the school district level, for example, or using other heuristics.
Certainly, however, this paper’s ﬁndings point to the important of further research to
determine when, if at all, voters hold local representatives accountable, and if so for what
outcomes. In particular, these ﬁndings highlight the importance of designing studies to
distinguish the eﬀects of informational signals about public service performance from un-
derlying performance. Finally, if information signaling poor performance really can increase
incumbent vote share in local elections, it is imperative that we understand how widespread
this phenomena may be and the mechanisms through which it operates.
333 The Eﬀects of Informational Signals
About Student Performance on Pa-
rental Behavior
Despite the widespread introduction of systems of public accountability in schooling in recent
decades, there is little evidence that information about test scores aﬀects people’s political
behavior.1 Most studies have focused on the eﬀects of test score information on the market
for public school places, that is, how information aﬀects where people choose to send their
children and where to live (Weimar and Wolkoﬀ 2001, Figlio and Lucas 2004, Henderson
2010).2 The few studies that have explored political responses to academic performance
information have found little evidence that information aﬀects citizens’ political behavior
(Chapter 2 in this dissertation, Berry and Howell 2007).
The lack of evidence that performance information aﬀects political behavior has nor-
1For example, “League tables” were introduced in 1996 for secondary schools and 1992 for primary schools in
England (McNally 2012, 11). These tables were disseminated to the public and used by central government
in determining school sanctions for poor performance (Burgess et al. 2005, 8). In the United States, the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 required states and school districts to issue annual report cards’ informing
families of the academic performance of their child’s school and the qualiﬁcations of their teachers. There
were escalating consequences for schools failing to make adequate yearly progress on state tests for all or a
subgroup of their students.
2For overviews of the literature on school performance and house prices see Black and Machin (2011) and
Gibbons et al (2013).
34matively troubling implications for school performance, since political mechanisms play an
important role in improving school performance (Hirschman 1970). Understanding the mech-
anisms through which performance information may raise standards is a particular concern,
as we currently lack consistent evidence that performance information aﬀects school results.
Numerous studies have found that school performance information improves performance
at the school level when combined with sanctions (for example, Chiang 2009, Chakrabarti
2012).3 Fewer studies have considered the eﬀects of informational signals alone, and the
ﬁndings of these studies are mixed (Hanushek and Raymond 2005, 321, Figlio and Rouse
2006, West and Peterson 2006, C54).4
Studies of the eﬀect of academic performance information on political and school-level
outcomes have focused on the eﬀects of school-level information. These studies have ignored
the increase in information available to parents about the performance of their own children
that has taken place in recent decades. Examinations were introduced in English state schools
in the early to mid-1990s at ages 7, 11, and 14, ﬁrst in English, math, and science, and then
ar a n g eo fo t h e rs u b j e c t s ,a n ds c h o o l sw e r er e q u i r e dt oi n f o r mp a r e n t so ft h e i rc h i l d r e n ’ s
performance (Watt 2004, 117-118). In America, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
required states to begin testing students in grades 3-8 annually in reading and mathematics
and, subsequently, to test students in science at least once in elementary, middle, and high
3The introduction of high-stakes testing Chicago, Florida, and New York public schools has been shown
to have led to improvements in test scores in (Jacob 2005; Chakrabarti 2012, Chiang 2009, Rouse et al.
2007, Figlio and Rosue 2006, West and Peterson 2006; Rockoﬀ and Turner 2008, Winters and Cowen 2012).
Studies exploiting variation in the timing of the introduction of high-stakes testing across states have likewise
found a positive eﬀect on academic performance (Dee and Jacob 2011, Rosenshine 2003, Carnoy and Loeb
2002). For a review of the literature on high-stakes testing, see William (2010).
4Figlio and Rouse (2006) and West and Peterson (2006, C54) ﬁnd that schools in Florida that received poor
performance grades, but not so poor as too be under threat of sanction, experience gains in tests scores.
On the other hand, Hanushek and Raymond (2005, 321) ﬁnd that while accountability systems introduced
during the 1990s had a clear positive impact on student achievement, states that simply provide information
through report cards without attaching consequences to performance did not see signiﬁcantly larger impacts
than those with no accountability.
35school.5
At the same time, studies that have looked at the eﬀects of student-level performance
information have focused on the eﬀects of information on individual student eﬀort and test
scores. Bandiera et al. (2008) ﬁnd that providing students at an English university with
test and essay grades increases students’ subsequent eﬀort and test scores, throughout the
distribution. Tran and Zeckhauser (2012) and Azmat and Iriberri (2010) show that providing
students in Vietnam and Spain with information about their performance in relation to the
class has a positive eﬀect on subsequent test scores, again throughout the distribution.
None of these studies looks at how individual-level performance information aﬀects parental
behavior, however, or considers public schooling in the UK or US.
This paper explores the eﬀects of informational signals about individual student per-
formance on a series of subsequent parental behaviors: speaking to teachers, helping with
homework, getting involved with the school, and paying for private classes. I ﬁrst extend
Hirschman’s (1970) framework, in light of subsequent research, to develop hypotheses con-
cerning parental responses to informational signals. I employ a dataset of exam scores of
students in England that is linked to a national survey of adolescents and their parents. I
identify the causal eﬀect of the attainment levels awarded to students using a regression
discontinuity design, which compares students just above and just below the thresholds for
diﬀerent attainment levels. I ﬁnd evidence that informational signals about student perfor-
mance have persistent eﬀects on parental behavior.
5http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/no-child-left-behind/. Accessed 10th June 2014.
363.1 Predicting the Eﬀects of Informational Signals
Hirschman’s (1970) model of consumer responses to declines in organizational performance
underpins much of the literature on school accountability, and provides a good starting
point for predicting parental responses to informational signals about student performance.6
Hirschman highlights two responses to declines in organizational performance: consumers
can either exit from the organization, or voice their concerns. Since consumers trade oﬀ exit
and voice, making exit easier reduces voice. On the other hand, loyalty can hold exit at bay
and provide more scope for voice.7 Hirschman posits that the viability of an organization
depends on the organization’s responsiveness to whatever combination of exit and voice its
consumers exercise.
Hirschman does not explore the causal mechanisms linking organizational performance
to consumer behavior. He therefore does not consider whether consumers respond to the
performance of the organization as a whole or to their individual experiences, or examine
the role of information in this process. Numerous studies of retrospective voting, however,
have extended Hirschman’s reasoning to consider whether voters examine their own personal
economic conditions, or look at the aggregate state of the economy (Kinder and Kiewiet
1981, Kiewet 1983, Markus 1988, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, 194). It is likewise a small
extension of Hirschman’s framework to propose that information signaling poor performance
will encourage exit or voice (for example, Henderson 2010, 3, Berry and Howell 2005, 153).
We can gain further insights into parental responses to student performance informa-
6Studies of school accountability that draw directly on Hirschman include Berry and Howell (2004), and
Henderson (2010).
7“Exit and voice are behavioral responses for Hirschman; loyalty, whilst having some behavioral components,
is more of an attitude or disposition of the agent towards the organization or product. The important use
of loyalty in Hirschman is as a mediator between exit and voice.” (Dowding and John 2012, 59)
37tion by unpacking the concept of voice in Hirschman’s framework. Hirschman deﬁnes voice
broadly as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable
state of aﬀairs” (Hirschman 1970, 30). Most obviously, voice involves consumers expressing
“their dissatisfaction directly to management or some other authority to which management
is subordinate” (Hirschman 1970, 4). In the context of public schooling, the former might
include complaining to a child’s teachers, or organizing a protest through a parents associa-
tion. Studies of voice in public schooling, however, have focused primarily on the latter, in
the form of voting in school board elections (Berry and Howell 2007, Barrows 2014).
Developments in the social sciences since 1970, point to the value of considering consumer
responses to organizational performance other than exit and expressing dissatisfaction. Eli-
nor Ostrom introduced the concept of “coproduction” in public services, whereby citizens
“play an active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them” (Ostrom
1996, 1073). In the context of schooling, researchers have found evidence that parental co-
production varies across public and private schools, public and charter schools, and with the
use of school vouchers (Bifulco and Ladd 2005, Peterson 2006, 2009, Fleming 2011). While
coproduction falls within Hirschman’s broad deﬁnition of voice, for clarity I shall here refer
to coproduction and voice as distinct responses.
I distinguish individual from collective coproduction. Individual coproduction involves
parents directly helping only their own children, for example, by helping with homework.
Collective coproduction involves parents also helping other children at the school, for exam-
ple, by helping out in class.8 These two forms of coproduction have diﬀerent implications for
subsequent organizational performance. Individual coproduction provides no signal to the
8The deﬁnitions of individual and collective coproduction proposed here diﬀer from the distinction proposed
by Bifulco and Ladd’s (2005, 555), and subsequently adopted by Fleming (2011), “between independent
coproduction, where citizens eﬀectively produce their own outcomes above and beyond the contributions
of government, and “participatory” coproduction, where citizens work with government to improve what
government does for them.”
38school that it needs to improve, and can serve to mask organizational failings. In contrast,
collective coproduction directly helps to improve school performance.
Af u r t h e rp o s s i b l er e s p o n s et oi n f o r m a t i o ns i g n a l i n gp o o rs t u d e n tp e r f o r m a n c ei sf o r
parents top up their children’s education with private tuition. In OECD countries, such
topping up is widespread. On average, 27.4% of students report participating in out-of-
school time lessons with non-school teachers.9 Further, Ireson and Rushforth (2011, 11) ﬁnd
that 59% of parents in England who pay for private tuition do so in part “to help achieve the
highest examination grades.” This ﬁnding suggests that topping up is a likely response to
information signaling poor performance. Like individual coproduction, topping up may have
a detrimental eﬀect on organizational performance, as it provides no signal that a school
needs to improve and can serve to mask organizational failings.
Ih y p o t h e s i z et h a ti nr e s p o n s et oi n f o r m a t i o ns i g n a l i n gp o o rs t u d e n tp e r f o r m a n c ep a r e n t s
who do not exit from the public school system will engage in voice, individual and collective
coproduction, and topping up. Over time, however, I expect some of these responses to prove
more persistent than others, particularly when a student moves school. The persistence of
ar e s p o n s ew i l ld e p e n do nb o t ht h ee x t e n tt ow h i c hi ti n v o l v e saf o r m a l i z e dr o u t i n ea n d
the extent to which is linked to a particular school. Paying for private tuition involves a
formal arrangement with another adult and is unconnected to a particular school, so should
prove persistent. Collective coproduction is heavily dependent on an arrangement with a
particular school, so is less likely to persist when a student moves school. The persistence
of voice and individual coproduction will likely fall in between these two responses: neither
depends on a formal arrangement with a particular school, but neither necessarily involves
a formal routine.
9OECD 2011, 85.
39We can also form predictions concerning the relationship between a student’s underlying
test score performance and parental voice, coproduction, and topping up, holding constant
the informational signal about student performance. Current parental engagement, in the
form of voice, coproduction, and topping up, is likely closely correlated with prior paren-
tal engagement. Prior parental engagement has been shown to have a positive eﬀect on
present student performance.10 Therefore, all else equal, I expect current parental voice,
coproduction, and topping up to be positively correlated with current student performance.
Finally, it is worth noting that while I expect information signaling poor performance to
depress voice, coproduction, and topping up, this is very much an open empirical question. In
particular, one could make a reasonable case for expectating eﬀects in the opposite direction.
Hoover-Dempsey et al. (2005) identify a sense of eﬃcacy as an important determinant of
parental involvement. If information signaling poor performance leads parents to feel that
the help they are already giving their children is ineﬀective, this information could in fact
depress voice, coproduction, and topping up.
3.2 Schooling and Examinations in England
The national curriculum in England is organized into blocks of years called ‘key stages.’
Primary school lasts for six years, from ages 5-6 to ages 10-11. Key Stage 1 covers the ﬁrst
two years of primary school, and Key Stage 2 covers Years 3-6. Key Stage 3 covers the
ﬁrst three years of secondary school, Years 7-9. Key Stage 4 covers the last two years of
compulsory schooling, Years 10-11, which students complete at ages 15-16. 11
10For reviews of the literature on the eﬀects of parental engagement on student performance see Wilder
(2013), Emerson et al. (2012), Shute et al. (2011), Hoover-Dempsey et al. (2005).
11https://www.gov.uk/national-curriculum/overview. Accessed 3rd June 2013.
40Students sit compulsory examinations in English and math at the end of Key Stage 2,
and in English, math and science at the end of Key Stage 3. Compulsory examinations in
science at the end of Key Stage 2 were abolished in 2010. Students are also assessed by their
teachers at the end of Key Stages 2 and 3.12 Students sit General Certiﬁcate of Secondary
Education (GCSE) examinations in English, math, science, and other optional subjects at
the end of Key Stage 4.13
Reporting regulations require schools to report to parents at the end of Key Stages 2
and 3 their child’s teacher assessment levels, test levels, what the levels mean, comparative
school results, and comparative national results from the previous year (QCA 2004a, 65-66,
86, QCA 2004b, 69, 71, 90). Appendix A, Figure A1, shows a recommended format for
presenting results. Results aggregated to the school level are also made publicly available in
school league tables.
3.3 Data
Data on student performance in Key Stage 2 exams were obtained from the National Pupil
Database (NPD), which contains data on the exam results of all pupils in state-funded, or
partially state-funded, schools in England.14 Data from the NPD were linked to data from
the ﬁrst wave of the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE).15 The ﬁrst
12Key Stage 3 examinations were introduced in 1993 and Key Stage 2 examinations in 1995, http://www.
nfer.ac.uk/nfer/research/assessment/assessment-development/. Accessed 3rd June 2013.
13https://www.gov.uk/national-curriculum/key-stage-3-4. Accessed 17th June 2013.
14http://www.adls.ac.uk/department-for-education/dcsf-npd/?detail/. Accessed 3rd June 2013/.
Accessed 3rd June 2013.
15http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=5545/. Accessed 3rd June 2013. The linked
dataset is available at: https://www.education.gov.uk/ilsype/workspaces/public/wiki/Welcome/.
Accessed 3rd June 2013.
41wave of the LSYPE interviewed 15,770 young people in England and at least one of their
parents (Department for Education 2011, 13). All of these observations are included in the
linked dataset. As the LSYPE samples only 530 of students at independent schools, I drop
these observations from my sample (Department for Education 2011, 55).
The young people in the LSYPE sample sat Key Stage 2 exams at the end of Year 6,
in May 2001, aged 10-11. Parents received reports of their children’s attainment levels that
summer, and the young people then started secondary school in the fall of 2001.16 The First
Wave of the LSYPE was conducted 3 years later, between 30th March and 19th October
2004, when the young people were aged 13-14.17
Ie m p l o yK e yS t a g e2m a t ha n ds c i e n c es c o r e sa sm yr u n n i n gv a r i a b l e s . 18 Key Stage 2
math scores run from 0-100, with Level 5 awarded for a score of 79 or greater, Level 4 for a
score of 49 or greater, Level 3 for a score of 22 or greater, and Level 2 for a score between
19 and 21. Key Stage 2 science scores run from 0-80, with Level 5 awarded for a score of
65 or greater, Level 4 for a score of 39 or greater, Level 3 for a score of 18 or greater, and
Level 2 for a score between 15 and 17 (QCA 2001). A small number of students in the
datasets were awarded Level 2 or below and the coding in the dataset did not state their
exact points scores. I therefore focus only on students who fall within the Level 3 range
or higher. Parents were informed in the report containing their child’s attainment levels
that Level 5 represents achievement above the nationally expected standard for 11 year-olds,
16It is worth noting, however, their parents would typically have had to apply for a secondary school place
by the fall of 2010, long before receiving Key Stage 2 performance data. https://www.gov.uk/schools-
admissions/applying. Accessed 3rd June 2013.
17http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=5545/. Accessed 3rd June 2013.
18Key Stage 2 English scores were also available; however, a regression discontinuity design would not
be appropriate in the case of English scores. For Key Stage 2 English, parents receive information about
students’ levels in both reading and writing, as well as their overall English level. Because of this additional
information, we would not expect a sharp shift in behavior around the cutoﬀ for each overall level in English
(QCA 2004a, 66).
42Level 4 represents achievement at the nationally expected standard, and Levels 3 and below
represent achievement below the nationally expected standard (QCA 2004a, 65-66, 86).
Im e a s u r ep a r e n t a lv o i c eu s i n gaq u e s t i o nt h a ta s k sp a r e n t a lr e s po n d e n t sh o wo f t e nt h e yo r
their partner speak to their child’s teachers about how their child is getting on at school.19 I
code this variable is 1 if they speak once a term or more, and 0 otherwise. I measure individual
parental coproduction using a question that asks young person respondents whether anyone
helps them with their homework. To measure collective parental coproduction, I use a
question that asks parental respondents how involved they personally feel in school life.
I code this variable as 1 if they feel very or fairly involved, and 0 if they feel not very
or involved or not involved at all. Finally, I consider responses to a question that asks
parental respondents whether they pay for private classes in subjects also taught at the
child’s school.20
Ia mu n a b l et oe x p l o r ew h e t h e ri n f o r m a t i o n a ls i g n a l sl e a dp a r e n t st ol e a v et h ep u b l i c
sector because, as noted above, the LSYPE samples only a small number of students at in-
dependent schools (Department for Education 2011, 55). The dataset also includes variables
reporting young person and parent background characteristics, which I employ in my anal-
ysis. These characteristics include the main parent’s age and education (from the LSYPE
Wave 1 Family Background Survey), the young person’ ethnicity (from the LSYPE Wave 1
Young Person Survey), and the young person’s year of birth (from the NPD database). The
list of background variables is somewhat limited, because the data has been stripped of all
features that might permit the identiﬁcation of individual students.21
19Cox and Witko (2010) and Dowding and John (2012) distinguish individual voice, where parents seek
primarily to inﬂuence their own child’s performance or experience in school, from collective voice, where
parents seek to aﬀect the functioning of the school as a whole. Unfortunately, however, there is not suitable
in the ﬁrst wave of the LSYPE for measuring collective parental voice.
20All questions are listed in full in Appendix B.
21Data extracts containing more background covariates is held by the UK Department for Education; how-
43There are a number of advantages to employing Key Stage 2 data from 2001. Employing
data from Key Stage 2 exams isolates the eﬀect of informational signals about student per-
formance from the eﬀect of sanctions or other incentives. Students’ results were not used in
subsequent admissions decisions by schools or institutions of higher education, or reported
to employers. The schools themselves did not face oﬃcial rewards or sanctions. Employing
examination data from 2001 also excludes the possibility that signiﬁcant ﬁndings are contin-
gent on heightened media attention following the introduction of reporting arrangements, as
in Berry and Howell (2007). Key Stage 2 exams were ﬁrst introduced in 1995.22
The dataset employed in this paper does have limitations, however. Key Stage 2 exam
results were sent to parents during the summer after their child ﬁnished primary school, and
before starting secondary school. There was also an approximately three-year gap between
the publication of the exam results and the period in which interviews were conducted for
the ﬁrst wave of the LSYPE. This paper is therefore unable to explore parental responses
directed at the school responsible for the exam results, or their short-run responses. On the
other hand, it seems entirely plausible that performance information could have eﬀects on
parental behavior that become ingrained and persist for many years, and such responses are
also of considerable interest.
A further limitation of the data employed in this paper is that they do not permit
the examination of the causal mechanisms through which reported student performance
inﬂuences parental behavior. In particular, we cannot exclude the possibility that reported
student performance inﬂuences parental behavior via school or student behavior. Since 2000,
ac o p yo fe a c hc h i l d ’ sr e p o r th a sf o r m e dap a r to fh i so rh e re d u c a t i o n a lr e c o r da n dm u s tb e
ever, such data is only released tor researchers based at UK institutions, owing to the conditional nature
of the data and the potential it oﬀers to identify individuals (author correspondence with the Department
for Education, 4th September 2013).
22http://www.nfer.ac.uk/nfer/research/assessment/assessment-development/. Accessed 3rd June
2013.
44transferred automatically when a child changes school (QCA 2004a, 66). This information
might well inﬂuence schools’ streaming decisions, for example, to which parents might in
turn respond.
3.4 Method
To explore whether there are discontinuities in reported parental behaviors at the Key Stage
2l e v e lc u t o ﬀ s ,Ip l o tb i n n e da v e r a g e so ft h ep r o p o r t i o no fr e s p o n d e n t sr e p o r t i n gab e h a v i o r ,
and add regression lines based on fourth-order polynomial regressions estimated separately
on either side of each cutoﬀ. This graphical presentation of the data gives a sense of “whether
the jump in the outcome variable at the cutoﬀ is unusually large compared to the bumps
in the regression curve away from the cutoﬀ” (Lee and Lemiuex 2010, 284). If the basic
plot does not show any evidence of a discontinuity, “there is relatively little chance that-
more sophisticated analyses will lead to robust and credible estimates with statistically and
substantially signiﬁcant magnitudes” (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 622).
Ad i s a d v a n t a g eo fe m p l o y i n gp o l y n o m i a lr e g r e s s i o n st op r o v i d ef o r m a le s t i m a t e so fd i s -
continuities at the level cutoﬀs, however, is that this method provides global estimates of the
regression function; that is, it uses data far away from the cutoﬀ point to predict values of the
outcome at the cutoﬀ point. In contrast, the justiﬁcation for using a regression discontinuity
design relies on comparing local estimates at the cutoﬀ point (Lee and Lemieux 2010, 316).
I therefore employ local linear regressions to test for discontinuities at the diﬀerent grade
cutoﬀs.23
23Sartarelli (2013) employs a similar design to explore the eﬀect of reported student performance on young
people’s risky behavior.
45When using local linear regressions to test for discontinuities at the cutoﬀs, linear regres-
sions are ﬁtted within bins on both sides of the cutoﬀ, and these regressions are then used to
predict values of the outcome variable at the cutoﬀs. We may employ local linear regressions
that use weights that vary with the distance from the cutoﬀ or the center of the bin (Imbens
and Lemieux 2008, 624-625). Below I compute local linear regressions for numerous points
on either side of the cutoﬀ and graph predictions from these local linear regressions; however,
the estimate of the jump still uses only the two estimates at the cutoﬀ (Nichols 2007, 531).24
If o l l o wt h ea p p r o a c hs u g g e s t e db yI m b e n sa n dL e m i e u x2 0 0 8 ,6 2 5 )a n dL e ea n dL e m i e u x
(2010, 319) of employing a simple rectangular kernel, and verifying the robustness of the
results to diﬀerent choices of bandwidth. I ﬁt each model with bandwidths of 4, 6, and 8
points.
3.5 Results
Figures 3.1-3.4 plot the proportion of parents at each math score reported as speaking to
teachers at least every term, helping with homework, feeling involved with the school, or
paying for private classes. Regression lines based on fourth-order polynomial regressions are
estimated separately on either side of the key stage level cutoﬀs.
Looking at the relationship between math scores and parental outcomes within each key
stage level, there is a strong negative relationship between math scores and the proportion
of parents who speak to teachers at least every term (Figure 3.1). This is surprising, as
Ie x p e c t e dv o i c et ob ep o s i t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e dw i t hp e r f o r m a n c e ,g i v e nas t u d e n t sk e ys t a g e
level. It is also somewhat surprising that there is no clear relationship between math scores
24All local linear regressions are estimated using the regress discontinuity design package in R: Dimmery,
Drew 2013. “rdd”. Related ﬁgures are plotted using modiﬁed code from this package.
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Vertical lines show the thresholds for attainment levels 4 (49 points) and 5 (79 points).
Figure 3.1: Binned averages showing the proportion of parents who speak to teachers every
term, against child’s Key Stage 2 Math score, with polynomial ﬁt.
and parental involvement with their child’s school (Figure 3.3). This could reﬂect the sub-
jective phrasing of the question used to measure parental involvement, which asked parents
how involved they “personally feel...in school life.”25 Consistent with my expectations, there
appears to be a weak positive relationship between math scores and helping with home-
work, and a strong positive relationship between math scores and paying for private tuition
(Figures 3.2 and 3.4).
Turning to consider the eﬀects of informational signals about student performance, there
25See Appendix B.
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Vertical lines show the thresholds for attainment levels 4 (49 points) and 5 (79 points).
Figure 3.2: Binned averages showing the proportion of parents who help with homework,
against child’s Key Stage 2 Math score, with polynomial ﬁt.
is a drop of around 10 percentage points at the Level 4 threshold in the proportion of parents
speaking to teachers at least once a term (Figure 3.1). There also appears to be a drop of
between 5 and 10 percentage points at the Level 5 threshold in the proportion of parents
paying for private tuition (Figure 3.4). There is also a possible jump at the Level 4 threshold
in the proportion of parents helping with homework, and a drop at the Level 5 threshold in
the proportion of parents who are involved with their child’s school; however each of these
discontinuities appears to be no more than around 5 percentage points (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).
I ﬁt local linear regressions to explore whether the jumps at the level thresholds observed
in Figures 3.1-3.4 are statistically signiﬁcant. Table 3.1, Row 2, reports a statistically signiﬁ-
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Vertical lines show the thresholds for attainment levels 4 (49 points) and 5 (79 points).
Figure 3.3: Binned averages showing the proportion of parents who feel involved with
school, against child’s Key Stage 2 Math score, with polynomial ﬁt.
cant drop at the Level 4 threshold of between 10 and 13 percentage points, depending on the
bandwidth employed, in the probability speaking to a teacher at least every term. Table 3.1,
Row 7, reports a statistically signiﬁcant drop at the Level 5 threshold of between 7 and 10
percentage, again depending upon the bandwidth employed, in the probability of speaking
to a teacher at least every term. No other discontinuities are statistically signiﬁcant. It is
reassuring that the results from ﬁtting local linear regressions are consistent with our initial
polynomial plots, and that the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated eﬀects does not vary
across bandwidths, while the size of the estimated eﬀects varies only slightly.
Figure 3.5 plots binned averages of the proportion of parents who talk to teachers every
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Vertical lines show the thresholds for attainment levels 4 (49 points) and 5 (79 points).
Figure 3.4: Binned averages showing the proportion of parents who pay for private classes,
against child’s Key Stage 2 Math score, with polynomial ﬁt.
term against the student’s math score, along with local linear regression estimates of this
proportion. Figure 3.6 likewise plots binned averages of the proportion of parents who
pay for private classes against the student’s science score, along with local linear regression
estimates. In each case, the discontinuities reported in Table 1 appear to be consistent with
the plotted data. While both results do appear to be driven by points near the level cutoﬀ,
it is important to note that each point in the ﬁgure represents an average of observations in
ag i v e nb i n ,r a t h e rt h a nas i n g l eo b s e r v a t i o n .
That a student’s reported math level has a greater eﬀect on the probability of paying for
private tuition than on any other outcome is consistent with our expectations. As discussed,
50Table 3.1: Regression discontinuity estimates of Key Stage 2 Math Level eﬀects on reported
parental behavior
Bandwidth (Math Points)
4 5 6
(1)
Speak to teacher
L5/L4 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(2) L4/L3 -0.13* -0.11* -0.10*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
(3)
Help homework
L5/L4 -0.01 -0.001 -0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
(4) L4/L3 0.08 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(5)
Involved in school
L5/L4 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07.
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(6) L4/L3 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
(7)
Private classes
L5/L4 -0.10** -0.07* -0.07*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(8) L4/L3 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
private tuition is the most likely response to persist, because it involves a formal arrangement
with another adult and that is unconnected to a particular school. Similarly, it is consistent
with our expectations that a student’s math level does not have a lasting eﬀect on collective
coproduction. While I was unable to predict how the eﬀect of information on voice would
compare to the eﬀect on individual coproduction, it is also entirely consistent with the theory
outlined above that we ﬁnd an eﬀect for the former outcome but not the latter.
Ap u z z l er a i s e db yt h e s er e s u l t si sw h yt h e r ei sad r o pi nt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo ft a l k i n gt o
teachers each term at one level cutoﬀ but not the other, and likewise in the case of paying
for private classes. In each case, there are intuitively plausible explanations for this variation
across grade cutoﬀs. It may be that only receiving information that one’s child is below the
nationally expected standard is a worrying enough signal to provoke a change in parental
engagement with their child’s teachers that persists for several years. Similarly, learning that
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Figure 3.5: Discontinuity in talking to teachers at least every term at the Level 4/Level 3
Math cutoﬀ
your child is above the nationally expected standard may lead parents to feel they do not
need to pay for private tuition, while parents whose children are at or below the nationally
expected standard are suﬃciently concerned to make the investment.
In e x te x p l o r et h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nr e p o r t e dp a r e n t a lb e h a v i o r sa n ds t u d e n ta t t a i n -
ment in science. Plotting binned averages of reported parental behaviors and ﬁtting poly-
nomial regressions, we see that the relationships within each level between science scores
and parental outcomes are similar to the relationships between math scores and parental
outcomes. The proportion of parents who speak to teachers every term decreases with the
student’s the science score (Figure 3.7), the proportion of parents who help with homework
increases with science score (Figure 3.8), there is little relationship between school involve-
ment and science scores (Figure 3.9), and the proportion of parents who pay for private
classes increases with science scores (Figure 3.10).
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Figure 3.6: Discontinuity in paying for private classes at Level 5/Level 4 Math cutoﬀ
Turning to consider the eﬀect of informational signals about student performance in
science, there is no evidence of a jump beyond 2 or 3 percentage points at either of the level
thresholds for any of the outcomes (Figures 3.7-3.10). Consistent with this, Table 3.2 reports
no evidence of a discontinuity that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level at either cutoﬀ,
for any outcome variable, for any bandwidth. At ﬁrst glance it is surprising that students’
attainment levels in Key Stage 2 math appear to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on some parental
behaviors, while there is no evidence of reported attainment levels in science having any
eﬀect on parental behavior. A likely explanation for this diﬀerence, however, is that in the
English education system achievement in math is given more weight than achievement in
science. In particular, receiving ﬁve or more A*-C grades in English and math is often a
requirement for continuing education beyond age 16.26
26For example, http://www.scc.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Find-out-what-is-right-for-you-2013-
14.pdf. Accessed 16th June 2014.
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Vertical lines show the thresholds for attainment levels 4 (39 points) and 5 (65 points).
Figure 3.7: Binned averages showing proportion of parents who speak to teachers every
term, against child’s Key Stage 2 Science score, with polynomial ﬁt.
3.6 Speciﬁcation checks
Ac o n c e r ni nr e g r e s s i o nd i s c o n t i n u i t yd e s i g n si st h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tt h e r em a yb ec h a n g e s
in covariate values at the cutoﬀs. Such changes could aﬀect the outcome, with the eﬀects
being erroneously attributed to treatment (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 631). To explore this
possibility, I employ local linear regressions to test the null hypothesis of zero average eﬀect
at each cutoﬀ for a range of diﬀerent covariates. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the results of
these tests for math and science scores, with each test conducted for a range of bandwidths.
For both math and science scores, there is no evidence of a discontinuity in any covariate,
at any cutoﬀ, or for any bandwidth.
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Vertical lines show the thresholds for attainment levels 4 (39 points) and 5 (65 points).
Figure 3.8: Binned averages showing proportion of parents who help with homework,
against child’s Key Stage 2 Science score, with polynomial ﬁt.
As e c o n dc o n c e r ni nr e g r e s s i o nd i s c o n t i n u i t yd e s i g n si st h a tt h er u n n i n gv a r i a b l et h a t
determines assignment, in this case to an attainment level, may have been manipulated
around the level cutoﬀs. If individuals are able to manipulate the assignment variable, one
could reasonably expect individuals on either side of the threshold to diﬀer systematically
(Lee and Lemieux 2009, 13-14, Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 631).27 For example, if students
had the option of retaking exams, which was not the case, students with more engaged
parents might be more likely to do so. We would then likely ﬁnd that students just below a
cutoﬀ did not represent a valid counterfactual for students just below a cutoﬀ.28
27In other words, without the assumption that that individuals have imprecise control over the assignment
variable, we cannot assume local random assignment.
28See Lee and Lemieux (2009, 13) for a similar example.
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Vertical lines show the thresholds for attainment levels 4 (39 points) and 5 (65 points).
Figure 3.9: Binned averages showing proportion of parents who feel involved with their
child’s school, against child’s Key Stage 2 Science score, with polynomial ﬁt.
One test of the assumption that the assignment variable has not been manipulated is
to inspect a histogram of the assignment variable for discontinuities at the cutoﬀs (Lee and
Lemieux 2009, 50-51). Figure 3.11 presents the histograms for Key Stage 2 math and science
scores. We observe large jumps around the level thresholds for both math and science scores,
although the jumps are smaller for math scores. I also employ McCarry’s(2008) test for the
null hypothesis of continuity in density of the running variable at the cutoﬀ, against the
alternative hypothesis of a jump in the density function. The p-value for McCarry’s test
is less than 0.001 for each of the cutoﬀs considered, providing strong evidence in each case
to reject the null hypotheses of continuity in the density of the test score variable at each
cutoﬀ.
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Vertical lines show the thresholds for attainment levels 4 (39 points) and 5 (65 points).
Figure 3.10: Binned averages showing proportion of parents who pay for private classes,
against child’s Key Stage 2 Science score, with polynomial ﬁt.
It is possible, however, to have discontinuities in the assignment variable around the
thresholds even where there is no failure of identiﬁcation. McCrary (2008, 701) gives the
example of teachers selecting at random students who barely fail an exam to receive bonus
points. Closer inspection of the process generating Key Stage 2 math scores suggests that
the assumption of local random assignment does likely hold for the design employed in this
paper.
Manipulation of math scores around the level thresholds by students was essentially
impossible. Draft level thresholds set before the exams were taken were not made available
to students, ﬁnal level thresholds were set after students had taken the exams, and students
did not retake the exams. Manipulation of the assignment variable by examiners was also
57Table 3.2: Regression discontinuity estimates of Key Stage 2 Science Level eﬀects on
reported parental behavior
Bandwidth (Science Points)
4 5 6
(1)
Speak to teacher
L5/L4 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(2) L4/L3 -0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
(3)
Help homework
L5/L4 0.001 -0.02 -0.04.
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
(4) L4/L3 -0.03 -0.001 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
(5)
Involved in school
L5/L4 -0.01 -0.01 0.003
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(6) L4/L3 -0.03 -0.01 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
(7)
Private classes
L5/L4 -0.03 -0.04. -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(8) L4/L3 -0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
unlikely. The exams were marked by external examiners who did not know the students and
followed a clear mark scheme that left little room for discretion. Examiners also initially
marked the exams without knowing the ﬁnal level thresholds (QCA 2004c, 4).
It is conceivable that after learning the ﬁnal thresholds examiners made qualitative judg-
ments about students near the level thresholds. However, it seems more plausible that
examiners were more inclined to add points for those just below a boundary than deduct
points from those just above when checking marks near thresholds. The discontinuities in
math scores are therefore likely explained by some students just above a threshold hav-
ing been incorrectly assigned extra marks initially, as if at random, similar to the example
proposed by McCarry (2008).
At h i r ds e to ft e s t sc o m m o n l ye m p l o y e di nr e g r e s s i o nd i s c o n t i n u i t yd e s i g n si n v o l v e se s t i -
58Table 3.3: Regression discontinuity estimates of jumps in covariates at Key Stage 2 Math
Level cutoﬀs
Bandwidth (Math Points)
4 5 6
(1)
Degree Main Parent
L5/L4 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(2) L4/L3 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
(3)
A-Levels Main Parent
L5/L4 0.07 0.06 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
(4) L4/L3 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
(5)
GCSEs Main Parent
L5/L4 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(6) L4/L3 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
(7)
Age Main Parent
L5/L4 0.19 0.33 0.01
(0.59) (0.52) (0.47)
(8) L4/L3 1.31. 1.00 1.22.
(0.78) (0.67) (0.63)
(9)
Student White
L5/L4 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(10) L4/L3 -0.04 -0.08 -0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
(11)
Student YOB
L5/L4 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(12) L4/L3 -0.08 -0.08. -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
mating jumps at points where there should be no jumps (Imbens and Lemieux 2008, 632).
Table 3.5 reports the results of placebo tests that look for discontinuities in the probability
of speaking to the child’s teachers at least once a term at false cutoﬀs 5, 10, and 15 points
above and below the actual cutoﬀs. None of the estimates of jumps at these false cutoﬀs is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level for any bandwidth. Table 3.6 reports corresponding
placebo estimates for discontinuities in the probably of paying for private tuition. Again,
none of the estimates of jumps at the false cutoﬀs is statistically signiﬁcant.
59Table 3.4: Regression discontinuity estimates of jumps in covariates at Key Stage 2 Science
Level cutoﬀs
Bandwidth (Science Points)
4 5 6
(1)
Degree Main Parent
L5/L4 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(2) L4/L3 0.03 0.03 0.03.
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(3)
A-Levels Main Parent
L5/L4 0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(4) L4/L3 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
(5)
GCSEs Main Parent
L5/L4 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(6) L4/L3 -0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
(7)
Age Main Parent
L5/L4 -0.59 -0.47 -0.37
(0.42) (0.38) (0.34)
(8) L4/L3 -0.25 0.19 0.59
(0.96) (0.85) (0.76)
(9)
Student White
L5/L4 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(10) L4/L3 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
(11)
Student YOB
L5/L4 -0.06. -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(12) L4/L3 0.07 0.05 0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
3.7 Conclusions
This paper explores whether informational signals about the academic performance of stu-
dents in low-stakes exams in England aﬀect subsequent parental behavior. I ﬁnd that in-
forming parents that their child is below the nationally expected standard in math, rather
than at that standard, increases the probability that the parents speak to the child’s teachers
at least once every term by around 10 percentage points. I also ﬁnd that informing parents
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Students were awarded achievement Level 5 in math for receiving 79 or points, and
Level 4 or receiving 49 or more points. Students were awarded Level 5 in science for
receiving 65 or more points, and Level 4 for receiving 39 or more points. These cutoﬀs
are indicated with vertical lines.
Figure 3.11: Frequency of Key Stage 2 Math and Science scores.
that their child is at the nationally expected standard in math, rather than above that stan-
dard, increases the probability that the parents pay for private tuition by between 5 and 10
percentage points. These eﬀects are found three years after the parents were informed of
their children’s performance, and after the children had moved schools.
61Table 3.5: Regression discontinuity estimates of Key Stage 2 Math Level eﬀects on talking
to teachers, false cutoﬀs
Bandwidth (Math Points)
Cutoﬀ 4 5 6
(1) L5/L4 cutoﬀ + 15 -0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
(2) L5/L4 cutoﬀ + 10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(3) L5/L4 cutoﬀ + 5 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(4) L5/L4 cutoﬀ -5 0.06 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(5) L5/L4 cutoﬀ - 10 0.00 0.02 0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(6) L5/L4 cutoﬀ - 15 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(7) L4/L3 cutoﬀ + 15 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(8) L4/L3 cutoﬀ + 10 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(9) L4/L3 cutoﬀ + 5 0.02 0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(10) L4/L3 cutoﬀ - 5 -0.03 -0.04 0.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
(11) L4/L3 cutoﬀ - 10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
(12) L4/L3 cutoﬀ - 15 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
It is important to interpret the results of this paper with caution. This analysis fails
the standard test in regression discontinuity designs of continuity in the assignment variable
around the level cutoﬀs. Although closer consideration of the marking process suggests that
manipulation of the assignment variable is highly unlikely, the reader is nonetheless required
to accept the assumption that examiners did not make a qualitative judgement about the
candidates falling on either side of each level threshold. In addition, this paper looks at
parental behavior three years after parents were informed of their children’s performance,
62Table 3.6: Regression discontinuity estimates of Key Stage 2 Math Level eﬀects on paying
for private classes, false cutoﬀs
Bandwidth (Math Points)
Cutoﬀ 4 5 6
(1) L5/L4 cutoﬀ + 15 -0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
(2) L5/L4 cutoﬀ + 10 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
(3) L5/L4 cutoﬀ + 5 -0.04 -0.06. -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
(4) L5/L4 cutoﬀ - 5 0.03 0.00 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(5) L5/L4 cutoﬀ - 10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05.
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(6) L5/L4 cutoﬀ - 15 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(7) L4/L3 cutoﬀ + 15 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(8) L4/L3 cutoﬀ + 10 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(9) L4/L3 cutoﬀ + 5 0.01 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(10) L4/L3 cutoﬀ - 5 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
(11) L4/L3 cutoﬀ - 10 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
(12) L4/L3 cutoﬀ -15 -0.08. -0.06 -0.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
which makes the large eﬀects identiﬁed somewhat surprising.
Despite its limitations, this paper has important implications for both policy and future
research into the eﬀects of public accountability in education. With respect to policy, this
paper’s ﬁndings suggest that the publication of student-level performance information can
have substantial eﬀects on parental behavior. These parental responses have the potential
to improve not only individual student outcomes, but also performance at the school level.
For example, parents who talk to teachers more frequently may play a role in pushing for
63school improvements.
Closely related, the ﬁndings in this paper point to a productive avenue for future research
into the eﬀects of public accountability in education. Previous research into the eﬀects of
performance information on school-level outcomes and political behavior has focused on
information at the school-level. At the same time, research into the eﬀects of student-level
performance information has focused on the eﬀects of information on individual student
eﬀort and academic outcomes. This paper highlights the value of exploring the eﬀects of
student-level performance information on behaviors that can improve outcomes for the school
more broadly.
644 The Eﬀects of Relative School Per-
formance Information on Perceptions
of School Quality and Attitudes To-
ward School Reform
The introduction of the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) in 2014-2015 will allow
citizens to compare the performance of their local schools to schools nationally using a
common standard. For decades, people’s perceptions of local schools have been considerably
more positive than their perceptions of schools nationally. We might therefore expect new
common standards to provide a shock to people’s perceptions of school performance and,
in turn, their attitudes toward school reform. However, we currently know little about the
eﬀects of information about relative performance on people’s perceptions of local services,
despite a similar gap in perceptions existing in numerous diﬀerent domains.
Surveys of public opinion consistently ﬁnd that on average the public has a more positive
perception of things local than those same entities in the aggregate, across a range of diﬀerent
domains. People’s assessments of their own doctors are on average more positive than their
assessments of doctors in general, for example, and people assess their own Congressmen
more favorably than Congress as a body (Mutz and Flemming 1999, 79-82). An annual
65PDK/Gallup poll of attitudes toward public schools has consistently found the proportion
of respondents rating schools in their community A or B to be greater than the proportion
rating schools nationally A or B, since both questions were ﬁrst asked in 1981. In recent
years this gap has grown, and in 2013 stood at 35 percentage points (Figure 4.1).
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Data: PDK/Gallup Poll on the Public’s Attitudes Toward the Public Schools,
1974-2013
Figure 4.1: Proportion of respondents in each treatment group grading local schools and
schools nationally A or B
The gap between perceptions of local schools and schools nationally has potentially sub-
stantial political implications. Some educators and policy makers believe that people’s rela-
tively positive perceptions of local schools “aﬃrms that Americans are content with schools
as they currently exist, the status quo, and that too many Americans will not embrace im-
portant reform eﬀorts” (Bushaw and Lopez 2010, 13). Positive perceptions of local school
quality may also make citizens less likely to hold their elected representatives accountable
for the performance of local schools. Consistent with this expectation, Moe (2005, 13, 18)
ﬁnds that median turnout in the school board elections that he considers is just 9 percent,
66while incumbency increases the probability of election by 0.47.
Part of the explanation for the gap between people’s perceptions of local and national
school quality may be that people lack information about the relative performance of their
local public services. Studies have found little correlation between citizen performance evalu-
ations and administrative measures of performance in policing, ﬁre ﬁghting, refuse collection,
and other public services (Stipak 1979, Brown and Coulter 1983, Brown and Benedict 2002,
Kelly 2003). In schooling, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 required states and school
districts to issue annual report cards informing families of the proportion of children in dif-
ferent subgroups at their child’s school reaching proﬁciency on state academic standards.
States are allowed to design their exams and set their own proﬁciency standards, however,
and these standards vary widely (Peterson and Lastra-Anadon 2010). It is therefore diﬃcult
for citizens to judge the performance of their local schools relative to schools nationally.
If part of the explanation for the gap between people’s perceptions of local schools and
schools nationally is that they lack information, then providing people with relative perfor-
mance information may alter their perceptions. The introduction of CCSS will, for the ﬁrst
time, allow the comparison of local schools to schools nationally using a common standard.
CCSS provides a clear understanding of what students are expected to learn at each grade
level that is consistent across all states. 1 States will expected to align both their curricula
and assessments with CCSS by 2014-2015 or shortly thereafter. 2 While CCSS does not yet
propose to rank schools it will, at a minimum, make nationwide comparisons of schools far
easier than ever before.
The public may be surprised to learn the relative performance of their local schools, par-
1http://www.corestandards.org/the-standards. Accessed 19th December 2013.
2http://www.assessmentsforcommoncore.com/pdf/Common-Core-eGuide.pdf, p. 4; for details of imple-
mentation dates, see http://goo.gl/maps/eDzWx. Accessed 19th December 2013.
67ticularly in states with lax academic standards. If people’s perceptions of school performance
inﬂuence their attitudes toward school reform, any change in people’s perceptions could have
important political implications. The publication of the ﬁrst round of the Programme of In-
ternational Student Assessment study in 2000 resulted in the ‘PISA-shock’: a re-evaluation
of education in Germany in light of its unexpectedly poor performance relative to other
countries (Ertl 2006). Could a Common Core shock be around the corner in districts where
schools perform well on state tests, but are revealed to be underperforming nationally?
A survey experiment was administered to a nationally representative sample of Ameri-
cans, to explore the eﬀects of providing information about the relative performance of local
schools on people’s evaluations of schools and their attitudes to school reform. Respondents
in diﬀerent treatment groups were provided with information about the state, national or in-
ternational percentile of their local schools, and the graduation rates of local schools. They
were then asked to grade local schools and about their attitudes toward schools reform.
We ﬁnd strong evidence that relative performance information can aﬀect not only people’s
perceptions of school performance, but also their attitudes toward school reform.
4.1 Explaining the perception gap
The gap between perceptions of locals schools and schools nationally has received little theo-
retical attention. However, a literature in political science has explored the analogous puzzle
of the gap between citizens’ consistently favorable evaluations of their own Congressmen in
comparison to Congress as a whole, commonly referred to as “Fenno’s paradox” (see Fenno
1975).3 Studies of Fenno’s paradox provide some guidance as to the factors that may explain
3For an overview of the literature on Fenno’s paradox, see Harbridge and Malhotra 2011, 507.
68the gap between evaluations of local schools and schools nationally. Understanding the gap
in people’s perceptions of school quality will in turn inform our expectations with respect
to the eﬀects of providing respondents with information about the relative performance of
local schools.
The explanation for Fenno’s paradox with probably the most empirical support is that
“we apply diﬀerent standards of judgment, those that we apply to the individual being less
demanding than those we apply to the institution” (Fenno 1978, 278). Congress is judged,
often unfavorably, on the basis of its “performance on domestic policy, legislative-executive
relations, and the style and pace of the legislative process”, while Congressmen are judged,
usually favorably, primarily on the basis of “their service to constituents and their personal
characteristics” (Parker and Davidson 1979, 53, Born 1990, 1224). A number of studies have
found evidence of the particular importance of constituency contact in explaining support
for Congressmen (Cain et al. 1987, Ripley et al. 1992, Parker and Parker 1993, Lampkin
and Lyvette 2006).
Citizens holding schools to diﬀerent standards may likewise help to explain the gap in
evaluations of school quality. For example, parents may evaluate local schools in light of
how well the needs of their children are met. It seems likely that personal contact will play
an even more important role in shaping perceptions of local schools than Congressmen, as
public schools are ubiquitous and people have frequent contact with them (Chingos et al.
2012, 7). More than 50 percent of Americans report having visited a public school within
the past 12 months (Bushaw and Lopez 2012, 12). Further, when asked why Americans tend
to grade the public schools in their community higher than the public schools in the nation
as a whole, 43 percent of respondents attribute the diﬀerence to greater knowledge of local
schools (Bushaw and Lopez 2011, 19).
69A second explanation for Fenno’s paradox is that political processes and the media present
people with more negative information about Congress than their Congressmen, while psy-
chological biases make people more likely to remember negative information about Congress.
Fenno suggests that members often “run for Congress by running against Congress” (Fenno
1978, 168). In the process, people are presented with unfavorable information concerning
Congress as a body. Mutz and Flemming (1999, 90-95) argue that information about the
whole tends to originate from the often-negative national media, while information about
individual legislators generally comes from local news sources, which tend to be more posi-
tive. 4 In addition, Mutz and Flemming (1999, 88-90) propose that people have a negative
perceptual bias when recalling information about the collective, for example, being more
likely to remember negative examples, and at the same time a positive perceptual bias when
evaluating things local.
The information that citizens possess about the academic performance of local schools
may likewise help to explain the gap between perceptions of local and national school quality.
Just as members run against Congress, the management of individual schools and school
board members may well choose to argue that their school or district is performing eﬀectively
within a broken school system. The design of NCLB may also have skewed the information
that people receive about local schools. While NCLB requires states to report whether
schools are making adequate progress on state standards, it allows states to deﬁne their
own standards. There is evidence that poorly performing states have adopted lax standards,
which may distort people’s perceptions of local school performance (see Peterson and Lastra-
Anadon 2010). Finally, Mutz and Flemming (1999, 87) argue that the social-psychological
process they describe is not speciﬁc to Congress and, indeed, it seems just as likely to apply
to evaluations of local schools and schools nationally.
4Consistent with this theory, Schaﬀner (2006, 506) ﬁnds that incumbents who win more local newspaper
coverage are viewed as being more in touch with their district and more likely to win constituents’ support.
704.2 The eﬀects of school performance information
We hypothesize that presenting respondents with information about the state, national, or
international percentile of their local schools will aﬀect the grades that they assign to local
schools through both a “priming” mechanism and an “informational” mechanism. These
mechanisms correspond to the two explanations for Fenno’s paradox outlined above: that
people judge the local and national by diﬀerent standards, and have diﬀerent information
about the local and national.
Presenting respondents with a particular measure of relative school performance will
prime respondents to think of both academic performance and the relevant reference group,
thus changing the standards that they use to evaluate local schools. Presenting respondents
with relative performance information will also change the information that they can easily
call to mind. Where respondents are already evaluating schools in terms of the performance
measure with which they are presented, this new information will have a direct eﬀect on
their evaluations. In addition, having new information available may aﬀect respondents’
evaluations indirectly, by changing the criteria or reference group that they employ.
We further hypothesize that the eﬀect of providing respondents with the state, national,
or international percentile of their local schools will be to depress their perceptions of local
school quality. These treatments will both lead respondents to judge schools by less favorable
standards, and correct for the biases that lead people to overestimate the relative perfor-
mance of local schools in the absence of treatment. We also hypothesize that the eﬀect of
presenting respondents with the state, national, or international percentile of local schools
on perceptions of local school quality will be increasingly negative the lower the percentile
reported.
71In addition, we hypothesize that the eﬀect of providing respondents with performance
information relative to the state will be smaller than the eﬀect of providing relative national
or international performance information. While respondents lack full information about
the performance of their local schools, some will likely have draw inferences about the state
percentileoftheirlocalschoolsfromstatetestscores. Followingfromthisobservation, wealso
hypothesize that the greater the gap between the true state percentile and the true national
or international percentile of local schools, the greater will be the size of the corresponding
treatment eﬀect. Respondents who possess some information about the state percentile of
their local schools will require a larger adjustment in their perceptions the larger the gap
between the state percentile and the percentile reported to them.
We do not expect presenting respondents with the graduation rate of their local schools
to aﬀect the grades assigned to local schools. While be believe that citizens systematically
err in their evaluations of the relative performance of local schools, we have no reason to
think that in the absence of treatment citizens systematically err in their beliefs about the
graduation rates of local schools. We also do not expect any of the informational treatments
to aﬀect perceptions of schools nationally. Test scores and other countries are a more obvious
criterion and reference group by which to evaluate schools nationally than local schools. In
addition, Americans on average have a good idea of the performance of the nations schools
as a whole (Howell et al. 2009, 27). Even if some Americans do adjust their perceptions of
national school quality in response to information about local school performance, we have
no reason to believe that there is systematic error to correct.
Finally, we hypothesize that providing respondents with information about the relative
performance of their local schools will not only aﬀect their perceptions of local school quality,
but also make them on average more supportive of school reforms. Intuitively, it seems likely
that the worse people perceive to be the quality of their local schools, the more keen they
72will be for change, and in turn the more supportive they will be of school reforms. We focus
on three types of school reform: the introduction of charter schools, the provision of vouchers
to attend private schools, and the provision of vouchers for poorer children to attend private
schools.
4.3 Data
Sample: We employ data from the 2013 Education Next-PEPG Survey of Public Opinion,
conducted in June 2013 by the polling ﬁrm Knowledge Networks. The survey was admin-
istered to a nationally representative sample of 5567 Americans, with oversamples of public
school teachers, parents of school-age children, African Americans, and Hispanics. After
dropping observations that did not have survey weights, the total sample size was 5302.
Survey weights were employed in estimating all of the results reported below, to account for
non-response and the oversampling of speciﬁc groups. All models were also ﬁtted without
using survey weights, and there were no substantive diﬀerences between these results and
the results with weighting.
Experimental Conditions: Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four ex-
perimental treatment conditions. A control group was given no information about the per-
formance of their local schools (n =1 0 7 5 ) . A tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h es u r v e y ,t h r e eo t h e r
groups were told where their local school district ranked in the state (n =1 0 5 5 ) ,n a t i o n a l l y
(n = 1001), or internationally (n =1 0 7 5 ) .Aﬁ n a lg r o u pw a si n f o r m e do ft h ep r o p o r t i o no f
pupils within their local school district graduating high school within four years of entering
ninth grade (n =1 0 9 6 ) .
Outcome Variables: Respondents were asked to grade their local schools on a scale
73from A to F, and to do likewise for schools nationally. Respondents were also asked about
their attitudes toward school reform. Respondents were ﬁrst asked whether they support or
oppose the formation of charter schools. Responses were on a ﬁve-point scale from completely
support to completely oppose. Respondents were also randomly assigned to be asked about
their support for government funding for children to attend private schools in one of two
ways. A ﬁrst group was asked whether the respondent would support allowing families
with children in public schools to enroll their children in private schools instead, with the
government helping to pay part of the tuition. Responses were again on a ﬁve-point scale
from completely support to completely oppose. A second group was asked whether the
respondent would favor using government funds to pay the tuition of low-income students
who choose to attend private schools. Responses were on a ﬁve-point scale from completely
favor to completely oppose.
4.4 Method
For each outcome variable, we explore whether there is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the outcome of each active treatment group and the control group. In order to do
this, we create datasets of the control group and each treatment group, and ﬁt a proportional
odds model with treatment status as the only predictor. The proportional odds model
assumes that there is a latent response variable, Zi,u n d e r l y i n gt h ec a t e g o r i c a lo u t c o m et h a t
we observe, Yi,s u c ht h a tYi = j is observed if θj−1 <Z i <θ j.T h ep r o p o r t i o n a lo d d sm o d e l
also assumes a logit model for the cumulative probabilities of γij,w h e r eγij(xi)=P(Yi <
j|xi). We therefore ﬁt the model:
74log
γj(xi)
1 − γj(xi)
= θj − β
Txi,j = 1,...J-1
We initially ﬁt this model with a single predictor, which is equal to 1 if the respondent
was assigned to treatment and 0 otherwise.
We report an estimate of the relative odds for y>jcomparing the treatment and control
groups, that is:
exp(β
T(x1 − x2)) =
￿ P(Y> j |x1)
1 − P(Y> j |x1)
￿￿￿ P(Y> j |x2)
1 − P(Y> j |x2)
￿
where x1 =1a n dx2 = 0. Where the outcome variable is the grade assigned to local
schools, for example, the relative odds is the ratio of the odds of assigning grade A given
assignment to treatment, to the odds of assigning grade A given assignment to control. As
this odds ratio does not depend on j, the relative odds is, likewise, the ratio of the odds of
assigning A or B given treatment, to the odds of assigning A or B given control. We report
Wald-based conﬁdence intervals for our estimate of the relative odds.5 In addition, as odds
ratios are somewhat diﬃcult to interpret, we report the diﬀerence in predicted probability of
assigning A or B given assignment to treatment, and the predicted probability of assigning
Ao rBg i v e nc o n t r o l .
To test whether treatment assignment is a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of our out-
come variable, we conduct likelihood ratio tests comparing the model including the treatment
variable to the intercept only model. Likelihood ratio tests are more robust than Wald-based
hypothesis tests, and this is particularly the case when ﬁtting proportional odds models. We
5As estimating these conﬁdence intervals involves taking the exponent of the linear predictor, the conﬁdence
intervals are unlikely to be symmetrical.
75also conduct likelihood ratio tests to explore whether the statistically signiﬁcant treatment
eﬀects vary with the value of the percentile reported to respondents, or with the gap between
the state percentile of local schools and the percentile reported to respondents. Where there
is a statistically signiﬁcant interaction between treatment and a predictor variable, we plot
predicted probabilities of a speciﬁed outcome category, or categories, for the full range of
the predictor variable.
4.4.1 Drawing inferences about causal mechanisms
It is not possible to determine the degree to which the eﬀect of relative performance infor-
mation on the grades respondents assign to schools operates via priming, and the degree
to which this eﬀect operates via informational updating. To draw inferences about causal
mechanisms using standard experimental designs, like the design employed here, we need
to assume “sequential ignorability.” Sequential ignorability requires not only that treat-
ment assignment is ignorable (statistically independent of potential outcomes and potential
mediators), but also that the mediator of interest is ignorable given treatment status and
pretreatment confounders (Imai et al. 2011, 770).
The second part of the sequential ignorability assumption almost certainly does not hold
in this case. The conditioning set of covariates in the second part of sequential ignorability
“must only include pretreatment variables” (Imai et al. 2011, 772). However, a respondent’s
knowledge of school performance very likely aﬀects the criteria and reference group that
he or she uses in evaluating schools. Greater knowledge of the national percentile of local
schools, for example, may lead a respondent to put more weight on test scores as a criterion
and schools nationally as reference group.
Although it would be desirable to test the causal mechanisms hypothesized to explain the
76treatment eﬀect identiﬁed here, two considerations should somewhat mitigate concerns about
this limitation. Including the eﬀect of priming in our overall measure of the treatment eﬀect
may not limit the external validity of our ﬁndings to the degree it would in other settings.
Analogous to the mechanisms proposed in our study, the introduction of the Common Core
can be expected to both provide people with new information and, partly as a consequence,
push the performance of local schools relative to the nation or internationally to the front
of people’s minds. Thus, it is useful to estimate the eﬀect of a simultaneous change in the
salience of test scores and national or international comparisons, and in the information that
citizens have available.
Further, although study designs have been proposed that permit inference about causal
mechanisms without assuming of sequential ignorability, it is not clear that any would be
appropriate in this case. Imai et al. (2013, 13), for example, propose a design that replaces
the sequential ignorablity assumption with a ‘no-interaction’ assumption: the indirect eﬀect
of the mediator depends only on the value of the mediator, not the treatment. Again,
however, this almost certainly does not hold in this case. The eﬀect of a change in the
criterion or reference group that a respondent uses to evaluate schools will almost certainly
depend on the information they have available and, therefore, on the treatment.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Checking Balance
We ﬁrst conﬁrm that randomization has resulted in balance on the control group and each of
the treatment groups on observable characteristics. We compare group means for continuous
77and binary covariates (Table 4.1). We compare the distribution in the control group to the
distribution in each of the treatment groups for categorical variables (Figures 4.2 - 4.5). The
control group and each of the treatment groups appear to be balanced for every covariate
that we consider.
Table 4.1: Respondent characteristics by treatment group
Control State National International Graduation
treatment treatment treatment treatment
Percentile 49.66 50.56 50.38 49.90 50.23
statewide
Percentile 49.80 50.18 49.65 49.41 50.46
nationwide
Percentile 41.12 41.57 41.04 40.78 41.81
internationally
Graduation 75.05 75.18 75.03 75.05 75.44
rate
Age 47.96 47.82 58.51 47.84 48.46
Gender 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.43
School age 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.62
children
Metro area 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88
4.5.2 Perceptions of School Quality
We begin by considering the eﬀect of information about school performance on perceptions
of local school quality. Figure 4.6 presents the proportion of respondents in each treatment
group that assign grade A or B to the schools in their community. The proportion of
respondents assigning A or B to the schools in their community is lower for each of the
treatment groups assigned relative performance information than it is for the control group,
and is approximately the same for the group assigned information about graduation rates as
for the control group.
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For each outcome, frequencies for the state percentile group are plotted in the higher
ﬁgure, and frequencies for the control group are plotted in the lower ﬁgure.
Figure 4.2: Respondent characteristics in control and state percentile groups.
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.7 report the relative odds of assigning a given grade or higher to
local schools for each treatment group compared to the control group, and the corresponding
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For each outcome, frequencies for the national percentile group are plotted in the higher
ﬁgure, and frequencies for the control group are plotted in the lower ﬁgure.
Figure 4.3: Respondent characteristics in control and national percentile groups.
Wald-based conﬁdence intervals. These results indicate that being given information about
the performance of local schools relative to schools in the state, nationally, or internationally
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For each outcome, frequencies for the international percentile group are plotted in the
higher ﬁgure, and frequencies for the control group are plotted in the lower ﬁgure.
Figure 4.4: Respondent characteristics in control and international percentile groups.
depresses the odds of assigning local schools a given grade or higher (Table 4.2, Rows 1-3).
Likelihood ratio tests conﬁrm that these eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant (Table 4.3, Rows
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For each outcome, frequencies for the graduation rate group are plotted in the higher
ﬁgure, and frequencies for the control group are plotted in the lower ﬁgure.
Figure 4.5: Respondent characteristics in control and graduation rate groups.
1-3). In contrast, information about the graduation rates of local schools has no eﬀect on
perceptions of local school quality (Table 4.2, Row 4, Table 4.3, Row 4).
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Figure 4.6: Proportion of respondents in each treatment group grading local schools A or
B
Table 4.2: Grade assigned to local schools: Estimated odds ratios and predicted probabil-
ities comparing treatment to control
Treatment odds(Y>j|x=1)/odds(Y>j|x=0) C.I. P(A or B|x=1)-P(A or B|x=0)
State Percentile 0.755 (0.597, 0.977) -0.069
National Percentile 0.677 (0.529, 0.867) -0.096
International Percentile 0.629 (0.496, 0.798) -0.112
Graduation Rate 0.956 (0.752, 1.216) -0.011
We also calculate the diﬀerence between the predicted probability for each treatment
group of assigning A or B, as odds ratios are somewhat diﬃcult to interpret. In Table 4.2, we
see that receiving information about local school performance relative to the state reduces
the probability of assigning local schools A or B by approximately 7 percentage points
(Table 4.2, Row 1), information about performance relative to schools nationally reduces
this probability by around 10 percentage points (Table 4.2, Row 2), and information about
relative performance internationally by approximately 11 percentage points (Table 4.2, Row
3).
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Figure 4.7: Odds ratios for assigning local schools a given grade or higher for treatment vs
control
We next test whether the eﬀect of presenting respondents with the state, national, or
international percentile of their local schools varies with that percentile. Table 4.3 uses
likelihood ratio tests to compare, for each informational treatment, models including the
treatment-percentile interaction to appropriate nested models. There is some evidence, at
the 0.01 level, that the eﬀect of treatment does vary with the state and international per-
centiles (Table 4.3, Rows 6, 19-21). Further, there is evidence at the 0.05 level that the eﬀect
of treatment varies with the national percentile (Table 4.3, Rows 9-11). There is no evi-
dence that the eﬀect of treatment varies with the graduation rate presented to respondents
(Table 4.3, Row 28).
We also test whether the eﬀect of presenting respondents with the national or interna-
tional percentile of their local schools varies with the gap between that percentile and the
state percentile. For both the national or international percentile treatments, this gap itself
is a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of the grade assigned, but their eﬀect disappears once
we control for the respective national percentile (Table 4.3, Rows 12-13, 22-23). There is
no evidence that the eﬀect of treatment varies with the gap between either the national or
84Table 4.3: Likelihood ratio tests to compare models for grade assigned to local schools.
Full Model Reduced Model LRT p−value
(1) st 1 0.0004
(2) nt 1 < 0.0001
(3) it 1 < 0.0001
(4) gt 1 0.575
(5) st + sp st < 0.0001
(6) st + sp + st:sp st + sp 0.067
(7) nt + np nt < 0.0001
(8) nt + np + ng nt + ng < 0.0001
(9) nt + np + nt:np nt + np 0.012
(10) nt + np + ng + nt:np nt + np + ng 0.012
(11) nt + np + ng + nt:np + nt:ng nt + np + ng + nt:ng 0.059
(12) nt + ng nt < 0.0001
(13) nt + np +ng nt + np 0.679
(14) nt + ng + nt:ng nt + ng 0.229
(15) nt + np + ng + nt:ng nt + np + ng 0.069
(16) nt + np + ng + nt:np + nt:ng nt + np + ng + nt:np 0.472
(17) it + ip it < 0.0001
(18) it + ip + ig it + ig < 0.0001
(19) it + ip + it:ip it + ip 0.077
(20) it + ip + ig + it:ip it + ip + ig 0.076
(21) it + ip + ig + it:ip + it:ig it + ip + ig + it:ig 0.189
(22) it + ig it < 0.0001
(23) it + ip +ig it + ip 0.896
(24) it + ig + it:ig it + ig 0.187
(25) it + ip + ig + it:ig it + ip + ig 0.194
(26) it + ip + ig + it:ip + it:ig it + ip + ig + it:ip 0.605
(27) gt + gp gt < 0.0001
(28) gt + gp + gt:gp gt + gp 0.447
st, nt, it, and gt are the state, national, international and graduation rate treatments. sp, np,
ip, and gp are the state, national and international percentiles, and the graduation rate. ng
and ig are the gap between the national or international percentile and the state percentile.
international percentile and the state percentile (Table 4.3, Rows 14-16, 24-26).
We next plot how the predicted probability of assigning schools A or B decreases with
each of the diﬀerent measures of school performance, under both treatment and control; that
is, we plot predictions using the full models in Table 4.3, Rows 6, 9, 19, and 29. In Figure 4.8,
85we observe that, consistent with our expectations, the negative eﬀect of treatment on the
probability of assigning A or B to local schools decreases with the respective performance
measure, and in each case eventually disappears.
It possible that information about the relative performance of local schools might lead
respondents to revise their perceptions of schools nationally. To explore this possibility,
Figure 4.9 reports the proportion of respondents in each treatment group that assign grade
A or B to schools nationally. Table 4.4 and Figure 4.10 report the relative odds for each
treatment group, compared to the control group, of assigning a given grade or higher to
local schools, and the corresponding Wald-based conﬁdence intervals. These results indicate
that information about the performance of local schools, even relative to schools nationally,
does not aﬀect individuals’ perceptions of the quality of schools nationally. Likelihood ratios
tests conﬁrm that none of the treatment conditions has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
perceptions of the quality of schools nationally, compared to the control group (Table 4.5).
Table 4.4: Grade assigned to schools nationally: Estimated odds ratios and predicted
probabilities comparing treatment to control
Treatment odds(Y>j|x=1)/odds(Y>j|x=0) C.I. P(A or B|x=1)-P(A or B|x=0)
State Percentile 1.008 (0.784, 1.295) 0.001
National Percentile 0.964 (0.742, 1.254) -0.006
International Percentile 0.919 (0.710, 1.189) -0.014
Graduation Rate 1.055 (0.817,1.362) 0.009
Table 4.5: Likelihood ratio tests to compare models for grade assigned to schools nationally
Full Model Reduced Model LRT p−value
(1) state.treat 1 0.929
(2) national.treat 1 0.612
(3) internat.treat 1 0.313
(4) grad.treat 1 0.521
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Figure 4.8: Predicted probabilities of grading local schools A or B, against school perfor-
mance
870.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Control State National International Grad Rate
Treatment group
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
g
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
 
A
/
B
Figure 4.9: Proportion of respondents in each treatment group grading schools nationally
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Figure 4.10: Odds ratios for assigning schools nationally a given grade or higher for treat-
ment vs control
4.5.3 Attitudes Toward School Reform
We also explore the eﬀects of information about relative school performance on respondents’
attitudes toward school reform. The proportion of respondents indicating that they support
the formation of charter schools is greater in every active treatment group than in the control
group (Figure 4.11). When we ﬁt proportional odds models regressing support for charter
88schools on an indicator for treatment, the conﬁdence interval for each odds ratio intersects
zero; however, this is only just the case for the relative national performance and graduation
rate treatments (Table 4.6, Figure 4.12). Further, likelihood ratio tests, which are more
robust than Wald-based hypothesis tests, indicate that the relative national performance
and graduation rate treatments are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of support for charter
schools at the 0.05 level (Table 4.7, Rows 5, 6, 10). We estimate that both the relative
national performance and graduation rate treatments increase the probability of supporting
the formation of charter schools by just under 5 percentage points (Table 4.6, Rows 2, 4).
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Figure 4.11: Proportion of respondents in each treatment group supporting the formation
of charter schools
Table 4.6: Support for charter schools: Estimated odds ratios and predicted probabilities
comparing treatment to control
Treatment odds(Y>j|x=1)/odds(Y>j|x=0) C.I. P(Support|x=1)-P(Support|x=0)
State Percentile 1.127 (0.889, 1.431) 0.030
National Percentile 1.211 (0.950, 1.543) 0.047
International Percentile 1.004 (0.789, 1.276) 0.001
Graduation Rate 1.220 (0.963, 1.546) 0.049
We next explore whether the eﬀect of providing respondents with the national percentile
and graduation rate of local schools declines with the respective measure of local school
performance. Conducting likelihood ratio tests to compare models including interactions be-
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Figure 4.12: Odds ratios for support for charter schools for treatment vs control
Table 4.7: Likelihood ratio tests to compare models for support for charter schools.
Full Model Reduced Model LRT p−value
(1) st 1 0.126
(2) nt 1 0.017
(3) it 1 0.962
(4) gt 1 0.011
(5) nt + np nt < 0.0001
(6) nt + np + ng nt + ng < 0.0001
(7) nt + np + nt:np nt + np 0.052
(8) nt + np + ng + nt:np nt + np + ng 0.0513
(9) nt + np + ng + nt:np + nt:ng nt + np + ng + nt:ng 0.203
(10) nt + ng nt < 0.0001
(11) nt + np +ng nt + np 0.671
(12) nt + ng + nt:ng nt + ng 0.302
(13) nt + np + ng + nt:ng nt + np + ng 0.081
(14) nt + np + ng + nt:np + nt:ng nt + np + ng + nt:np 0.353
(15) gt + gp gt 0.089
(16) gt + gp + gt:gp gt + gp 0.383
st, nt, it, and gt are the state, national, international and graduation rate treatments. np and
gp are the state percentile and the graduation rate. ng is the gap between the national and the
state percentile.
90tween treatment and school performance provides some evidence that the eﬀect of treatment
declines with the national percentile, but no evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant interaction
between the graduation rate treatment and graduation rates (Table 4.7, Rows 7-8, 16). Fig-
ure 4.13 plots predicted support for charter schools under treatment and control, for both
the national and graduation rate information treatments. The size of the treatment eﬀect de-
clines with both national percentile and with the graduation rate. There is no evidence that
the eﬀect of providing the national percentile of local schools varies with the gap between
the national and state percentile of local schools (Table 4.7, Rows 7-9).
We also ﬁnd that providing people with information about the relative performance
of their local schools increases support for government funding of private school places, in
other words, for school vouchers. The proportion of respondents indicating that they support
government funding of private school places is higher in each of the three relative information
groups than in the control group, though it is not notably higher in the graduation rate
treatment group (Figure 4.14). Calculating odds ratios and conﬁdence intervals indicates
that this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level for the state and national treatment
groups only (Table 4.8, Figure 4.15). Likelihood ratio tests conﬁrm this result (Table 4.9,
Rows 1-4). We estimate that information about local school performance relative to other
schools in the state increases the probability of supporting government funding of private
school places by 8 percent, while information about performance relative to schools nationally
increases support by just over 10 percent (Table 4.8, Rows 1, 2).
Table 4.8: Support for school vouchers: Estimated odds ratios and predicted probabilities
comparing treatment to control
Treatment odds(Y>j|x=1)/odds(Y>j|x=0) C.I. P(Support|x=1)-P(Support|x=0)
State Percentile 1.382 (0.999,1.914) 0.081
National Percentile 1.539 (1.120,2.113) 0.107
International Percentile 1.183 (0.853,1.641) 0.042
Graduation Rate 0.980 (0.711,1.351) -0.005
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Figure 4.13: Predicted probabilities of supporting charter schools, against school perfor-
mance
There is no evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between treatment
and either the state or national percentiles (Table 4.9, Rows 6, 9-11). However, plotting
predicted probabilities against the state and national percentiles does suggest that the eﬀect
of treatment on support for school vouchers decreases with the state and national percentiles
(Figure 4.16). There is no evidence of a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between the national
percentile treatment and the gap between the state and national percentiles (Table 4.9, Rows
14-16).
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Figure 4.14: Proportion of respondents of in each treatment group supporting school
vouchers
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Figure 4.15: Odds ratios for support for school vouchers for treatment vs control
Finally, we explore whether information about relative school performance aﬀects indi-
viduals’ support for government funding for private school places speciﬁcally for low-income
students. We ﬁnd no evidence of a treatment eﬀect of any of the informational treatments
(Tables 4.10- 4.11, Figures 4.17 and 4.18).
93Table 4.9: Likelihood ratio tests to compare models for support for school vouchers.
Full Model Reduced Model LRT p−value
(1) st 1 0.003
(2) nt 1 0.0001
(3) it 1 0.127
(4) gt 1 0.856
(5) st + sp st 0.005
(6) st + sp + st:sp st + sp 0.138
(7) nt + np nt < 0.0001
(8) nt + np + ng nt + ng < 0.0001
(9) nt + np + nt:np nt + np 0.177
(10) nt + np + ng + nt:np nt + np + ng 0.182
(11) nt + np + ng + nt:np + nt:ng nt + np + ng + nt:ng 0.232
(12) nt + ng nt < 0.0001
(13) nt + np +ng nt + np 0.202
(14) nt + ng + nt:ng nt + ng 0.930
(15) nt + np + ng + nt:ng nt + np + ng 0.552
(16) nt + np + ng + nt:np + nt:ng nt + np + ng + nt:np 0.972
st, nt, it, and gt are the state, national, international and graduation rate treatments. sp and
npare the state and national percentiles. ng and is the gap between the national and the state
percentile.
Table 4.10: Support for school vouchers for low-income: Estimated odds ratios and pre-
dicted probabilities comparing treatment to control
Treatment odds(Y>j|x=1)/odds(Y>j|x=0) C.I. P(Support|x=1)-P(Support|x=0)
State Percentile 0.935 (0.658,1.328) -0.016
National Percentile 0.848 (0.593, 1.211) -0.039
International Percentile 0.988 (0.698, 1.398) -0.003
Graduation Rate 0.902 (0.638,1.275) -0.024
Table 4.11: Likelihood ratio tests to compare models for support for vouchers for low-
income
Full Model Reduced Model LRT p−value
(1) state.treat 1 0.552
(2) national.treat 1 0.144
(3) internat.treat 1 0.915
(4) grad.treat 1 0.350
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Figure 4.16: Predicted probabilities of supporting school vouchers, against school perfor-
mance
4.5.4 Testing the Proportional Odds Assumption
While statistical tests of the proportional odds assumption have been developed in some
software packages, these tests have a tendency to indicate that the parallel slopes assumption
does not hold in cases where it does (Harrell 2001, 335). 6 Harrell instead proposes stratifying
6See also: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/r/dae/ologit.htm. Accessed 26th May 2014.
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Figure 4.17: Proportion of respondents in each treatment group supporting school vouchers
for low-income students
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Figure 4.18: Odds ratios for support for school vouchers for low-income students for treat-
ment vs control
on the predictor and computing the logits of all proportions of the form Y ≥ j, j =1 ,2,...,k.
When the proportional odds assumption holds, the diﬀerence in logits between diﬀerent
values of j should be the same at all levels of the predictor, because the model dictates that
logit(Y ≥ j|X) − logit(Y ≥ i|X)=αj − αi for any constant x (Harrell 2001, 335).
Figures 4.19 plots the logits of the proportions for Y ≥ A, B, C, and D for each active
treatment condition and the control condition, for grades assigned to local schools. Fig-
96ures 4.20 and 4.21 plot the logits of the proportions for Y ≥ completely support, somewhat
support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, and completely oppose, for support
for charter schools and support for school vouchers. In all cases, we observe that the vertical
distance between any two logit estimates is consistent between the treatment group and the
control group. This indicates that the proportional odds assumption does hold.
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The square, circle, triangle, and plus signs correspond to Y ≥ A, B, C, D, respec-
tively. For each treatment group, the proportional odds assumption is checked
by examining the vertical consistency, between the treatment group and control
group, in the distance between any two of these symbols.
Figure 4.19: Grades assigned to local schools: checking the proportional odds assumption
for each treatment.
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The square, circle, triangle, and plus signs correspond to Y ≥ completely support,
somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, completely
oppose, respectively. For each treatment group, the proportional odds assumption
is checked by examining the consistency between the treatment group and control
group, in the distance between any two of these symbols.
Figure 4.20: Support for charter schools: checking the proportional odds assumption for
each treatment.
4.6 Conclusions
This paper analyses data from a survey experiment administered to a nationally represen-
tative sample of Americans in which diﬀerent treatments groups were provided with infor-
mation about the performance of their local schools relative to other schools in the state,
nationally, or internationally. We ﬁnd that being presented with relative performance infor-
mation on average depresses people’s perceptions of local school quality. Information about
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The square, circle, triangle, and plus signs correspond to Y ≥ completely support,
somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, completely
oppose, respectively. For each treatment group, the proportional odds assumption
is checked by examining the vertical consistency, between the treatment group and
control group, in the distance between any two of these symbols.
Figure 4.21: Support for school vouchers: checking the proportional odds assumption for
each treatment.
local school performance relative to the state reduces the probability of grading local schools
Ao rBb y7p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t s ,w h i l ei n f o r m a t i o na b o u tp e r f o r m a n c er e l a t i v et os c h o o l s
nationally or internationally depresses this probably by around 10 percentage points. In
each case, the absolute size of the treatment eﬀect declines in the relative performance mea-
sure with which respondents are presented, and ultimately disappears when respondents are
informed that their school is performing relatively well.
In addition, we consider whether providing people with information about the relative
99performance of their local schools aﬀects their attitudes toward school reform. We estimate
that providing respondents with information about performance relative to schools nationally
or graduation rate of their local schools increases the probability of supporting the forma-
tion of charter schools, in each case by just under 5 percent. We also ﬁnd that providing
respondents with information about performance relative to the state increases support for
government funding of private school places by 8 percent, and information about relative
national performance increases support for government funding of private school places by
just over 10 percent. Again, the absolute size of these treatment eﬀects declines in the per-
formance measure with which respondents are presented, and in most cases disappears when
respondents are informed that their local schools are performing relatively well.
We must exercise caution in using these ﬁndings to make predictions about how the
political impacts of CCSS will play out. External validity is a serious concern in the context
of any survey experiment but particularly here, as we do not know to what extent the results
we observe are explained by priming, as opposed to informational updating (Barabas and
Jerit 2010). In addition, while we predicted that changes in people’s perceptions of local
school quality would aﬀect their attitudes toward school reforms, the changes in perceptions
that we ﬁnd are not entirely consistent with the changes seen in respondents’ attitudes
toward reforms.
That being said, the ﬁndings presented in this paper suggest that CCSS has the potential
to produce a substantial shock to both people’s perceptions of the quality of their local schools
and their support for school reforms. These results also point to the value of further research
into the design of systems of public accountability. These results suggest that that the eﬀects
of systems of public accountability on citizens’ attitudes and political behaviors depend not
just on the provision of performance information, but on precisely the kind of information
provided. Future research could usefully explore both the extent to which these survey
100results generalize to the real world, and whether providing relative performance information
has a similarly substantial impact on people’s perceptions and attitudes in other domains.
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2004
listening
The national results shown here are actual figures as
provided by DfES.
6 17 48 27
7 10 39 42
8 30 45 15
6 20 44 29
2 10 46 41
1 1 5 21 49 24 0 0 0
1 1 4 20 46 28 0 0 0
0 1 2 15 51 31 0 0 0
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
These tables show the percentage of year 6 children achieving each level nationally in 2003.
Appendix  Appendix D
The reporting regulations require schools to report to
parents of children at the end of year 6 their child’s teacher
assessment levels, test levels, comparative school results
and, from the previous year, comparative national results.
The tables on this page exemplify how these requirements
might be met for reporting individual children’s, schools’
and national results. 
Further details on reporting can be found on pages 62–69.
Electronic versions of these forms are available on QCA’s
website at www.qca.org.uk/ca/tests
Alternatively schools can use any equivalent versions of
these forms.
Key stage 2 reports and the 2003
national results
or science; children awarded a compensatory level from the tests; and children entered for but not achieving a level
from the tests.
These tables show the percentage of children at the end of key stage 2 achieving each level in the school in 2004.
The number of children at the end of key stage 2:        
not entered#
#   formerly referred to as disapplied.
represents children who were not entered for the tests because they were working below level 3 in mathematics
Figures may not total 100 per cent because of rounding.
W  represents children who are working towards level 1, but have not yet achieved the standards needed for level 1.
Figure A1: Key Stage 2 report sent to parents from Qualiﬁcations and Curriculum Au-
thority (2004a, Appendix D, 86)
102Appendix B
Full questions from the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England (LSYPE) used to
measure each of the outcomes of interest: parental voice, individual coproduction, collective
coproduction, and use of private tuition. Responses are listed as coded in the analyses in
this paper.
Parental voice
So can I check, apart from any parents’ evenings, how often do you [or your husband/or
your wife/or your partner] talk to [name of sample member]’s teachers about how [he/she]
is getting on at school?
1 At least once a week; every two or three weeks; at least once a term
0 Less often than once a term; never
Individual parental coproduction
Does anyone here at home help you with your homework, even if it’s only occasionally?
1 Yes
0 No
Collective parental coproduction
How involved do you personally feel in [name of sample member]’s school life - would you
say that you feel...
1 Very involved; fairly involved
0 Not very involved, not at all involved
Private classes
In the last 12 months have you or another member of your family paid for [name of sample
member] to have private classes or lessons in subjects that they also do at school?
1 Yes
0 No
103Bibliography
Alsbury, Thomas. 2008. “Ch12. School Board Politics and Student Achievement.” In
Alsbury, Thomas L. (ed.) 2008. The Future of School Board Governance: Relevancy and
Revelation.R o w m a na n dL i t t l e ﬁ e l dE d u c a t i o n .
Azmat, G. and Iriberri, N. 2010. “The Importance of Relative Performance Feedback In-
formation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment using High School Students.” Journal of
Public Economics
Bandiera, O., Larcinese, V. and Rasul, I. 2009. “Blissful Ignorance? Evidence From a Nat-
ural Experiment on The Eﬀect of Individual Feedback on Performance.” mimeo, University
College London.
Barabas, Jason, and Jennifer Jerit 2010. “Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?” Amer-
ican Political Science Review, Vol. 104 No. 2.
Berkman, Michael B., and Eric Plutzer. 2005. Ten Thousand Democracies: Politics and
Public Opinion in America’s School Districts. Washington D.C., Georgetown University
Press.
Berry, Christopher R., and William G. Howell. 2005. “Democratic Accountability in Public
Education.” In Howell, William G. (ed.) 2005. Besieged: School Boards and the Future of
Education Politics.W a s h i n g t o n ,D . C :T h eB r o o k i n g sI n s t i t u t i o n .
Berry, Christopher R., and Howell, William G. 2007. “Accountability and Local Elections:
Rethinking Retrospective Voting.” Journal of Politics Vol. 69 No. 3.
Bifulco, Rober, and Helen F. Ladd. 2006. “Institutional Change and Coproduction of
Public Services: The Eﬀect of Charter Schools on Parental Involvement.” Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory.
Black, Sandra E., and Stephen Machin. 2011. “Housing Valuations of School Performance.”
In Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen J. Machin, Ludger Woessmann (eds.) 2011. The Handbook of
the Economics of Education, Vol 3. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Born, Richard. 1990. “The Shared Fortunes of Congress and Congressmen: Members May
Run from Congress, but They Can’t Hide.” The Journal of Politics. Vol. 52. No. 4.
Brender, Adi. 2003. “The Eﬀect of Fiscal Performance on Local Government Election
Results in Israel: 19891998.” Journal of Public Economics 87 (9): 21872205.
104Brown, K. and Coulter, P. 1983. “Subjective and objective measures of police service deliv-
ery.” Public Administration Review 43: 50-58.
Brown, Ben, and William Reed Benedict. 2002. “Perceptions of the Police: Past Findings,
Methodological Issues, Conceptual Issues, and Policy Implications.” Policing: An Interna-
tional Journal of Police Strategies and Management 25(3): 54380.
Burgess, Simon, Carol Propper, Helen Slater and Deborah Wilson. 2005. “Who wins and
who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English sec-
ondary schools.” Working Paper No. 05/128.
Bushaw, Willaim J., and Shane J. Lopez. 2010. “A Time For Change: The 42nd Annual
Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public’s Attitudes Toward the Public Schools.” Kappan
Magazine, Vol. 92, No. 1.
Bushaw, Willaim J., and Shane J. Lopez. 2011. “Betting on teachers: The 43rd Annual
Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public’s Attitudes Toward the Public Schools.” Kappan
Magazine,Vol. 93, No. 1.
Bushaw, Willaim J., and Shane J. Lopez. 2012. “Public education in the United State: A
nation divided.” Kappan Magazine, Vol. 94, No. 1.
Cain, Bruce E., John Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote.C a m b r i d g e ,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Carnoy, Martin, and Susanna Loeb. 2002. “Does External Accountability Aﬀect Student
Outcomes? A Cross-State Analysis.” Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Vol. 24,
No. 4, pp. 305-331.
Chakrabarti, Rajashri. 2012. “Vouchers, Public School Response, and the Role of Incentives:
Evidence from Florida.” Economic Inquiry,5 1 ,1 .
Chiang, Hanely. 2009. “How accountability pressure on failing schools aﬀects student
achievement.” Journal of Public Economics.
Chingos, Matthew M., Michael Henderson, and Martin R. West. 2010. “Citizen Percep-
tions of Government Service Quality: Evidence from Public Schools.” Quarterly Journal of
Political Science,7 ,1 - 3 5 .
Cox, James H. and Witko, Chris. 2010. “School Choice, Exit and Voice: Competition and
Parental School Decision-making.” APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.
Dee, Thomas S., and Brian Jacob. 2011. “The Impact of No Child Left Behind on Student
105Achievement.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 30, No. 3, 418446.
Department for Education 2011. LSYPE User Guide to the Datasets: Wave 1 to Wave 7.
Dowding, Keith, and Peter John. 2012. Exits, Voices and Social Investment: Citizens’
Reaction to Public Services. Cambridge University Press.
Emerson, Lance, Josh Fear, Stacey Fox, and Emma Sanders. 2012. “Parental Engage-
ment in Learning and Schooling: Lessons from Research.” Family-School and Community
Partnerships Bureau.
Ertl, Hubert. 2006. “Educational standards and the changing discourse on education: the
reception and consequences of the PISA study in Germany.” Oxford Review of Education,
32:5, 619-634.
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1975. “If, as Ralph Nader Says, Congress Is ’The Broken Branch,’
How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?” in Norman J. Ornstein, ed., Congress in
Change: Evolution and Reform. New York: Praeger, pp. 277-287.
Fenno, Richard, 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts.L o n g m a n .
Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Eﬀects of
Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
123: 703-45.
Ferraz, Claudio, Frederico Finan, and Diana B. Moreira. 2012. “Corrupting Learning:
Evidence from Missing Federal Education Funds in Brazil.” Journal of Public Economics,
96 (9-10), 712-726.
Figlio, David N., and Maurice E. Lucas. 2004. “What’s in a Grade? School Report Cards
and the Housing Market.” American Economic Review,9 4 ( 3 ) :5 9 1 6 0 4 .
Fleming, David J. 2011. “Choice, Voice & Exit: School Vouchers in Milwaukee.” APSA 2011
Annual Meeting Paper.
Florida Department of State 2007. 2008 State Qualifying Handbook. Available at: http:
//election.dos.state.fl.us/publications/pdf/2007-2008/2008StQualHand.pdf
Accessed 18th June 2014.
Florida Department of State 2009. 2010 State Qualifying Handbook. Available at:http:
//election.dos.state.fl.us/publications/pdf/2010/StateQualifyingHB.pdf
Accessed 18th June 2014.
106Gibbons, Stephen, Stephen Machin, and Olma Silva. 2013. “Valuing school quality using
boundary discontinuities.” Journal of Urban Economics,7 5 ,1 5 - 2 8 .
Hanushek, Eric A., and Margaret E. Raymond. 2005. “Does School Accountability Lead to
Improved Student Performance?” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
Harbridge, Laurel, and Neil Malhotra. 2011. “Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conﬂict in
Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments.” American Journal of Political Science
Harrell, Frank E., Jr. 2001. Regression Modeling Strategies: With Applications to Linear
Models, Logistic Regression and Survival Analysis.S p r i n g e r
Healy, Andrew, and Neil Malhotra. 2013. “Retrospective Voting Reconsidered” Annual
Review of Political Science.1 6 : 1 8 . 1 1 8 . 2 2 .
Henderson, Michael. 2010. “Does Information Help Families Choose Schools? Evidence
from a Regression Discontinuity Design.” PEPG Working Paper Series 10-17.
Hess, Frederick. 2008. “Ch7. Money, Interest Groups, and School Board Elections.” In
Alsbury, Thomas L. (ed.) 2008. The Future of School Board Governance: Relevancy and
Revelation.R o w m a na n dL i t t l e ﬁ e l dE d u c a t i o n .
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hoover-Dempsey, K.V., and Sandler, H.M. 2005. Final Performance Report for OERI Grant
# R305T010673: The Social Context of Parental Involvement: A Path to Enhanced Achieve-
ment. Presented to Project Monitor, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of
Education, March 22, 2005.
Howell, William G., Paul E. Peterson, and Martin R. West. 2009. “The Persuadable Public:
The 2009 Education Next-PEPG Survey asks if information changes minds about school
reform.” Education Next.
Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2011. “Unpacking the
Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Obser-
vational Studies.” American Political Science Review
Imai, Kosuke, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2013. “Experimental designs for
identifying causal mechanisms.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics
in Society)
Imbens, Guido W., and Karthik Kalyanaraman 2009. “Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the
107Regression Discontinuity Estimator.”
Imbens, Guido W., and Thomas Lemieux. 2008. “Regression discontinuity designs: A guide
to practice.” Journal of Econometrics
Ireson, Judith and Katie Rushforth 2011. “Private tutoring at transition points in the
English education system: its nature, extent and purpose.” Research Papers in Education,
26:1, 1-19.
Jacob, B., 2005. “Accountability, incentives, and behavior: the impact of high-stakes testing
in the Chicago public schools.” Journal of Public Economics 89, 761796.
Kelly, Janet M. 2003. “Citizen Satisfaction and Administrative Performance Measures: Is
There Really a Link?” Urban Aﬀairs Review 38(6): 85566.
Kiewiet, D. R., 1983. Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Eﬀect of Economic
Issues. Chicago Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
Kinder, D. R. Adams, and Kiewiet, D. R. 1981. “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case.”
British Journal of Political Science,1 1 / 2 :1 2 9 - 6 1 .
Kirst, Michael W., and Frederick M. Wirt. 2009. The Political Dynamics of American
Education.M c C u t c h a n :C a l i f o r n i a .
Lampkin, Cheryl Lyvette. 2006. “Getting the Vote: How Congressional Constituency Con-
tact Equals Positive Public Opinion.” The Public Purpose.S p r i n g2 0 0 6 .
Lee, David S., and Thomas Lemieux. 2009. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Eco-
nomics.” NBER Working Paper 14723.
Lewis-Beck, M.S, and M. Stegmaier. 2000. “Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes.”
Annual Review of Political Science3( 1 ) :8 3 - 2 1 9 .
Linn, Suzanna, Jonathan Nagler, and Marco A. Morales. 2010. “Economics, Elections,
and Voting Behavior.” In Leighley, Jane E. (ed.) 2010. The Oxford Handbook of American
Elections and Political Behavior Oxford University Press.
Markus, G. B. 1988. “The impact of personal and national economic conditions on the
presidential vote: a pooled cross-sectional analysis.” American Journal of Political Science.
32(1):13754.
McCrary, Justin 2008. “Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Disconti-
nuity Design: A Density Test,” Journal of Econometrics,1 4 2( 2 ) ,6 9 8 7 1 4 .
108McNally, Sandra. 20120. “Report to the LSE Growth Commission: Education and Skills.”
Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/growthCommission/
documents/pdf/contributions/lseGC_mcnally_edSkills.pdf. Accessed 19th June 2014.
Moe, Terry M. 2005. “Political Control and the Power of the Agent.” The Journal of Law,
Economics, & Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1.
Mutz, Diana, and Gregory M. Flemming. 1999. “How Good People Make Bad Collectives.”
In Congress and the Decline of Public Trust, ed. J. Cooper. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
8095.
Nichols, Austin. 2007, “Causal inference with observational data.” The Stata Journal,V o l .
7, No. 4, 507-541.
OECD 2011. Quality Time for Students: Learning In and Out of School.O E C DP u b l i s h i n g .
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264087057-en).
Oliver, J. Eric, and Shang E. Ha. 2007. “Vote Choice in Suburban Elections.” American
Political Science Review 101 (3): 393-408.
Ostrom, Elinor 1996. “Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Develop-
ment.” World Development Vol. 24 No. 6 pp. 1073-1087.
Parker, Glenn R., and Roger H. Davidson. 1979. “Why Do Americans Love Their Con-
gressmen so Much More than Their Congress?” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 4, No.
1.
Parker, Suzanne L., and Glenn R. Parker 1993. “Why Do We Trust Our Congressmen?”
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 2.
Peterson, Paul E. 2006. “Productivity of Public and Private Schools.” In Hanushek E.
Courting Failure: How School Adequacy Lawsuits Pervert Judges’ Good Intentions and Harm
Our Children. Stanford, California: Hoover Institutional Press.
Peterson, Paul E. 2009. “Nobel Prize Winner Elinor Ostrom and Her Theory of Co-
Production”, Education Next. Available at http://educationnext.org/nobel-prize-
winner-elinor-ostrom-and-her-theory-of-co-production/ Accessed 9th July 2013.
Peterson, Paul E. and Carlos Xabel Lastra-Anadon. Fall 2010. “State Standards Rise in
Reading, Fall in Math.” Education Next.
QCA (Qualiﬁcations and Curriculum Authority) 2001. Level Threshold Tables and Age
Standardised Scores for Key Stage 2 Tests in English, Mathematics and Science and Year 7
109Progress Tests in English and Mathematics.
QCA (Qualiﬁcations and Curriculum Authority) 2004a. Key Stage 2 Assessment and Re-
porting Arrangements.
QCA (Qualiﬁcations and Curriculum Authority) 2004b. Key Stage 3 Assessment and Re-
porting Arrangements.
QCA (Qualiﬁcations and Curriculum Authority) 2004c. Level threshold tables and age stan-
dardized scores for key stage 2 tests in English, mathematics and science.
Ripley, Randall B., Samuel C. Patterson, Lynn M. Maurer, and Steven V. Quinlan. 1992.
“Constituents’ Evaluations of US House Members.” American Politics Research.
Rockoﬀ, Jonah E., and Lesley J. Turner. 2008. “Short Run Impacts of Accountability on
School Quality.” NBER Working Paper 14564.
Rosenshine, B. V. 2003. “High-stakes testing: Another analysis.” Education Policy Analysis
Archives,1 1 ( 2 4 ) .
Rouse, Cecilia Elena, Hannaway, Jane, Goldhaber, Dan, Figlio, David. 2007. “Feeling
the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability
Pressure.” NBER Working Paper 13681
Sartarelli, Marcello 2013. “Does Doing Well at School Aﬀect Risky Behavior? Evidence
form Discontinuities in Test Scores.”
Schaﬀner, Brian F. 2006. “Local News Coverage and the Incumbency Advantage in the US
House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly
Shute, Valarie J. et al. 2011. “A Review of the Relationship between Parental Involvement
and Secondary School Students’ Academic Achievement.” Education Research International.
Stipak, B. 1979. “Citizen Satisfaction with Urban Services: Potential Misuse as a Perfor-
mance Indicator.” Public Administration Review 39: 4652.
Tran, Anh, and Richard Zeckhauser. 2012. “Rank as an inherent incentive: Evidence from
ae l de x p e r i m e n t . ”Journal of Public Economics
Trounstine, Jessica. 2010. “Representation and Accountability in Cities.” Annual Review of
Political Science 13: 407-423.
Watt, Michael G. 2004. “The Role of Curriculum Resources in Three Countries: The Impact
110of National Curriculum Reforms in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and
Australia.”
Weimer, D. L. and Wolkoﬀ, M. J. 2001. “School performance and housing values: using
noncontiguous district and incorporation boundaries to identify school eﬀects. ” National
Tax Journal,V o l .5 4 ,p p .2 3 1 5 3 .
West, Martin R., and Paul E. Peterson. 2006. “The Eﬃcacy of Choice Threats Within School
Accountability Systems: Results From Legislatively Induced Experiments.” The Economic
Journal,1 1 6 ,C 4 6 - C 6 2 .
Wilder, S. 2013. “Eﬀects of parental involvement on academic achievement: a meta-synthesis.”
Educational Review.
William, Dylan. 2010. “Standardized Testing and School Accountability.” Educational Psy-
chologist,4 5 : 2 ,1 0 7 - 1 2 2 .
Winters, Marcus A. and Joshua M. Cowen. 2012. “Grading New York: Accountability
and Student Proﬁciency in America’s Largest School District.” Educational Evaluation and
Policy Analysis.
111